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NEW MEXICO AS HOLLYWOOD'S BACKLOT: AN
EXAMINATION OF FILM FINANCING, STATE TAX
INCENTIVES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
DANIELLE M. CANTRELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
While Hollywood, California may be the center of the global entertainment
industry, it is certainly not the only place on Earth where movies and television
shows are produced. In recent decades, globalization, rising domestic production
costs, and lower foreign wages and exchange rates have forced more productions
abroad. This phenomenon of "runaway production" has grown to an alarming
problem of national proportions,' costing the American economy both billions of
dollars and thousands of jobs.2
A local solution to the national problem of runaway production is state tax
incentives for economic development. Currently, over forty states offer some form
of production subsidy to encourage companies to film their projects within the
United States.3 New Mexico's Film Incentive Program, established in 2002, is one
of the nation's most extensive and aggressive, boasting a $276 million fund
earmarked for film and television investment and production.4 The program's varied
offerings of loans, rebates, and other tax-free initiatives are helping to stem the tide
of runaway production, stimulating economic growth, and creating jobs.
As promising as New Mexico's solution sounds, it is not immune from attack.
State tax incentives in other industries have been challenged under Article I, Section5
8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution for discriminating against interstate commerce.
The Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause 6 is an additional barrier to these
incentives as it prevents unreasonable distinctions between citizens of different
states.7 Although the New Mexico Film Incentive Program is not under current
*
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1. MONITOR CO., U.S. RUNAWAY FILM AND TELEVISION PRODUCTION STUDY REPORT 2 (1999) [hereinafter
MONITOR REPORT]. Runaway productions are projects that are developed for initial release or broadcast in the
United States but are actually filmed in another country. Id. at 2. Please note that this Comment discusses a timely
topic. While I have tried to present the most up-to-date information available, this Comment includes sources that
may be subject to change in the near future. It is current as of November 16, 2007.
2. Id. at 3.
3. CTR. FOR ENTM'T INDUS. DATA & RESEARCH, THE GLOBAL SUCCESS OF PRODUCTION TAX INCENTIVES
AND THE MIGRATION OF FEATURE FILM PRODUCTION FROM THE U.S. TO THE WORLD: YEAR 2005 PRODUCTION
REPORT 61 (2006) [hereinafter CEIDR REPORT].
4. N.M. STATE INV. COUNCIL, FILM INVESTMENT PROGRAM OUTSTANDING LOANS SINCE INCEPTION
THROUGH JULY 31, 2007 1 (2007), http://www.sic.state.nm.us/PDF%20files/NM FilmInvestmentProgram
7.31.07_Final.pdf.
5. See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988) (energy); Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v.
Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (alcohol); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984) (manufacturing);
Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (finance); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137
(1970) (agriculture).
6. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2.
7. See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984)
(municipal residency); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (flat employment preference); Baldwin v. Fish &
Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371 (1978) (recreational hunting); Toomer v. Witseli, 334 U.S. 385 (1948)
(commercial fishing).
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attack for either of the aforementioned reasons, there is a possibility that it may not
pass constitutional muster if challenged in the future.
Part I of this Comment explores the reasons behind runaway production, its
economic impact, and the relationship between runaway production and state tax
incentives. 8 Part III describes the specific offerings of the New Mexico Film
Incentive Program, including the 25% Film Production Tax Rebate, the Film
Investment Loan Program, and Nontaxable Transaction Certificates.9 Part IV
discusses U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding state tax incentives and residency
restrictions and the implications this precedent could have on New Mexico's
fledgling film industry.' ° In conclusion, this Comment argues that New Mexico's
Film Incentive Program walks a fine constitutional line in regard to the Dormant
Commerce Clause but is well within the parameters of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RUNAWAY PRODUCTION AND
STATE TAX INCENTIVES
Hollywood, California. The name evokes images of glitz, glamour, and showbiz,
but the harsh reality is that many of today's biggest blockbusters are not wholly
filmed there, or even in the United States. Mission: Impossible III was shot in Italy
and China;" The Pink Pantherwas filmed in France, Czech Republic, Italy, and
Canada;12 and Eight Below was shot in Canada, Greenland, and Norway. 13 This
phenomenon is known in the entertainment industry as "runaway production."' 4
Runaway production exists where film and television projects are developed and
intended for initial release or broadcast in the United States but are actually filmed
in another country. 5
There are two major categories of runaway production: creative and economic. 16
Creative runaways go abroad in order to authenticate a story or setting or to satisfy
a certain director or actor preference." For example, the popular Pirates of the
Caribbeanfilms were shot in part in the Bahamas, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
and the Dominican Republic, 8 as the story involves the adventures of a

8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part Ill.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. MISSION: IMPOSSIBLE III (Paramount Pictures 2006); Internet Movie Database, Filming Locations for
MISSION: IMPOSSIBLE III, http://www.imdb.comi/title/tt03l7919/locations (last visited Oct. 21, 2007). The movie
was filmed in nineteen locations, including twelve in the United States. Id.
12. THE PINK PANTHER (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2006); Internet Movie Database, Filming Locations for THE
PINK PANTHER, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0383216/locations (last visited Oct. 21, 2007). The movie was filmed
in eleven locations, including three in the United States. Id.
13. EIGHT BELOW (Walt Disney Pictures 2006); Internet Movie Database, Filming Locations for EIGHT
BELOW, http://www.imdb.comltitle/tt0397313/locations (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
14. MONITOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. This report was commissioned by the Directors Guild of America
and the Screen Actors Guild to investigate the phenomenon of runaway film and television production by
quantifying the extent to which it has been occurring since 1990 and identifying its major causes. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (Walt Disney Pictures 2003); Internet
Movie Database, Filming Locations for PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL,
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swashbuckling pirate and his friends in the Caribbean islands.19 Economic runaways,
the more controversial of the two, are filmed abroad in order to reduce production
costs. 2° The three top-grossing films in the United States in 2005,21 Star Wars:
Episode Ill-Revenge of the Sith,22 The Chronicles of Narnia: The Lion, the Witch,
and the Wardrobe,23 and Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire,24 were shot almost
entirely on four continents-Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia-despite being
produced by American entertainment companies. 25 Economic runaways are
troubling because they have caused the American entertainment industry to lose
billions of dollars and thousands of jobs.26 Economic runaway production is in part
remedied by domestic film production incentives, the focus of this Article.27
Filmed entertainment and music exports are a $33 billion-a-year business in the
United States,28 so it is no surprise that film production and distribution is one of the
most economically significant industries in this country. 29 The industry directly
employs over 270,000 workers and boasts an annual payroll of $10.4 billion.30
While these numbers may seem staggering, runaway production is still of concern
to the local and national entertainment industry. Runaway production growth in the
United States is "overwhelmingly" fueled by economic runaways. 3'

http://www.imdb.con/title/tt0325980/locations (last visited Oct. 21, 2007). PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: DEAD
MAN'S CHEST (Walt Disney Pictures 2006); Internet Movie Database, Filming Locations for PIRATES OF THE
CARIBBEAN: DEAD MAN'S CHEST, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0383574/locations (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: AT WORLD'S END (Walt Disney Pictures 2007); Internet Movie Database, Filming
Locations for PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: AT WORLD'S END, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0449088/locations (last
visited Oct. 21, 2007). All three films were also shot at several locations in the United States.
19.

See Internet Movie Database, Synopsis for PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF THE BLACK

PEARL, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0325980/synopsis (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
20. MONITOR REPORT, supranote 1, at 2.

21. Internet Movie Database, Top Grossing Movies for 2005 in the USA, http://imdb.com/SectionsYears/
2005/top-grossing (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
22. STAR WARS: EPISODE II-REVENGE OF THE SITH (Lucasfilm Ltd. 2005); Internet Movie Database,
Filming Locations for STAR WARS: EPISODE IHi-REVENGE OF THE SrrH, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0121766/
locations (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
23. THE CHRONICLES OF NARNIA: THE LION, THE WITCH, AND THE WARDROBE (Walt Disney Pictures 2005);
Internet Movie Database, Filming Locations for THE CHRONICLES OF NARNIA: THE LON, THE WITCH, AND THE
WARDROBE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt036377 1/locations (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
24. HARRY POTTER AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE (Warner Bros. Pictures 2005); Internet Movie Database,
Filming Locations for HARRY POTTER AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0330373/locations
(last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
25. While there are many factors that influence the ultimate decision of where to shoot a film, cost is a major
one. See infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text. Although this author has no information as to why these
particular films were shot abroad, she thought it significant that they all were in light of the runaway production
phenomenon.
26. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 59-76 and accompanying text.
28. CEIDR REPORT, supra note 3, at 73.

29. Consumption of filmed entertainment, including cable and satellite TV, broadcast TV, consumer internet,
home video, box office, and in-flight entertainment, averaged 1,937 hours per person in 2006. MOTION PICTURE
ASS'N OF AM., U.S. ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY: 2006 MARKET STATISTICS 49 (2006), http://www.mpaa.org/
USEntertainmentlndustryMarketStats.pdf. That same year, the average person spent $695.56 on media such as cable
and satellite television, box office, home video, recorded music, video games, consumer internet, and consumer
books. Id. at 50. There were 599 theatrical films released in the United States in 2006, and the average box office
gross of all new releases that year was $15.8 million. Id. at 11.
30.

U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE MIGRATION OF U.S. FILM AND TELEVISION PRODUCTION 16 (2001)

[hereinafter DOC REPORT].
31.

MONITOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
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The Directors Guild of America (DGA) and the Screen Actors Guild (SAG), two
of the most powerful labor unions in the entertainment industry, commissioned a
1999 study, the Monitor Report, to investigate the trend of runaway film and
television production. 32 The report labeled economic runaway production "a
persistent, growing, and very significant issue for the U.S.

'33

It found that economic

runaways, including feature films, television movies, television mini-series, and
thirty- and sixty-minute television series, rose from 100 in 1990 to 285 in 1998, a
185 percent increase.'
Runaway production, though a critical matter today, is not new to the American
entertainment industry. A 1957 Hollywood American Federation of Labor Film
Council report noted a surge in projects shot abroad between 1949 and 1957. 35 The
report lists several factors that led producers to depart, including tax advantages,
subsidies, and blocked currencies.3 6 Nearly fifty years later, globalization is still a
big reason why productions run, and few industries, including entertainment, are
able to escape its reach.37 Many foreign governments have recognized the
tremendous profit potential in developing a film production industry. 38 They have
established the infrastructure and skilled labor necessary to host production
by
39
luring U.S. companies to their borders with generous incentive programs.
Canada is the top foreign destination where U.S. companies beleaguered by rising
domestic production and distribution costs transport their projects.' Canada has
instituted "the most extensive incentive program" in the world, featuring a variety
of wage and tax credits, financing packages, and investment funds.4' These

32.
33.
34.
35.
U.S.A., 21

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Pamela Conley Ulich & Lance Simmens, Motion Picture Production: To Run or Stay Made in the
Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 357, 358-59 (2001) (citing IRVING BERNSTEIN, HOLLYWOOD AM. FED'N OF

LABOR, HOLLYWOOD AT THE CROSSROADS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY 50 (1957)).

36. Id.
37. See id. at 361-63.
38. DOC REPORT, supra note 30, at 3.

39. Id. Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom are the top foreign destinations where productions run.
MONITOR REPORT, supranote 1, at 3. In Canada, both the federal and provincial governments offer a wide range
of incentives to assist domestic producers and attract foreign production. DOC REPORT, supra note 30, at 71-72.
In February of 2003, the Canadian government raised its production tax credits from eleven to sixteen percent for
foreign producers shooting there. CEIDR REPORT, supranote 3, at 35. The Canadian provinces are very competitive
in terms of attracting filmmakers, and Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, Alberta, and British Columbia offer tax credits
that range from eighteen to forty-five percent for domestic and foreign production. Id. at 35-37. The Australian
government has implemented a 12.5 percent tax rebate for big-budget film and television productions "lensed Down
Under." Id. at 48. To qualify, producers must spend a minimum of $7.8 million in the country. Id. In December of
2005, the British government announced new, major tax credits for films shot in the United Kingdom. Id. at 44.
Sixteen percent tax credits will be given for films with budgets above $34.8 million, and twenty percent credits for
films with budgets below that figure. Id.
40. MONITOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. Australia and the United Kingdom follow Canada as the top
foreign destinations for runaways. Id.
41. DOC REPORT, supra note 30, at 3. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (OUSTR) compiles an
annual survey of significant foreign barriers to United States exports. OUSTR, 2006 NATIONAL TRADE ESTtMATE
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document.brary/Reports-

Publications/2006/2006_NTE_Report/assetupload file929_9220.pdf. The report notes that "Canadian policies
prohibit foreign acquisitions of Canadian-owned film distribution firms." Id. at 80. A new distribution firm
established with foreign investment dollars may only market its own products. Id. "Indirect or direct acquisition of
a foreign distribution firm operating in Canada is only allowed if the investor undertakes to reinvest a portion of
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incentives can significantly lower budgets, causing productions to realize up to
twenty-six percent in total savings.42 Canada's incentive program is possible for
three reasons. First, due to technological advances, "physical proximity is no longer
a requirement for the many persons and sub-industries involved in the film
production chain. 43 Second, many foreign technicians have comparable expertise
to their American counterparts." Third, rapidly declining exchange rates and lower
Canadian wages during the 1990s facilitated runaways north-of-the-border. 45 As
Canada's experience demonstrates, filmmakers have taken advantage of lower
foreign labor and production costs when it has been as efficient to produce abroad
as in the United States. 46
Statistics show that Canada's incentive program has made an impact. In 1998,
eighty-one percent of runaways ran to Canada. 47 TV movies were most likely to run
there, with ninety-one percent of the 139 runaways 48 landing in "Hollywood North"
that year.4 9 U.S. production of made-for-television movies and mini-series collapsed
seventy-three percent, from a 1995 high of 182 movies to a 2003 low of forty-nine,
while Canadian production rose 1,786 percent, from seven movies in 1984 to 132
in 2000.50
The expansion of production incentives has also impacted theatrical featurelength films. The U.S. market share of production dollars for theatrical releases fell
from seventy-one percent in 1998 to forty-seven percent in 2005."' In this same
period, releases filmed abroad grew in market share from twenty-nine to fifty-three
percent.5 2 The number of theatrical releases filmed stateside dropped twenty-two
percent between 1998 and 2005, while the number filmed in the rest of the world
rose fifty-five percent.53 Feature film production in Canada grew 179 percent during
these years.54
Runaways impact more than just a film's bottom line. When a production leaves
the country, almost all work is performed by non-U.S. cast and crew. 55 These
positions include supporting actors, stunt performers, background performers,
assistant directors, production managers, and stage managers.56 The MonitorReport
estimates that 125,100 full-time equivalent industry positions were lost to economic

its Canadian earnings in a manner specified by the Canadian government." Id. This may partially explain Canada's
success in capturing and retaining foreign production dollars.
42. MoNTrOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 23.
43. DOC REPORT, supranote 30, at 4.
44. Id. at 3.
45. MONITOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.
46. DOC REPORT, supranote 30, at 4.
47. MoNrTOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
48. Id.
49. Joe Sisto, Outsourcingthe Movies: Runaway Productions ofAmerican Film and Television in Canada,
22 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 26, 27 (2004).
50. CEIDR REPORT, supranote 3, at 5.
51. Id. at 2.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 3.
54. Id.
55. MONITOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 16.
56. Id. at 16-17.
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runaway between 1989 and 1999."7 The DOC Report describes the story of runaway
production as a "story of a substantial transformation of what used to be a traditional
and quintessentially American industry into an increasingly dispersed global
industry."58
So what can be done to stem the tide of economic runaways and prevent
Hollywood from becoming "'Hollyhasbeen"'? 5 9 Domestic production incentives
seem to be the answer. Industry insiders have described them as "essential to
preserving the U.S. workforce in the American entertainment industry." 60 Infact,
states from coast to coast are following the lead of successful nations like Canada
by wooing production dollars through incentives. Currently, over forty states offer
some form of production subsidy."'
Production incentives seem to be having their desired effect, as domestic
production has increased in recent years.62 The dramatic increase in production in
domestic venues with subsidy programs is hardly coincidental. 63 In particular, it
appears that U.S. television production is bouncing back. The filming of scripted

57. Id. at 16.
58. DOC REPORT, supranote 30, at 86.
59. Ulich & Simmens, supra note 35, at 357.
60. Id. at 370.
61. CEIDR REPORT, supra note 3, at 61. New Mexico's four neighboring states each offer financial
incentives for film and television production. Arizona's Motion Picture Production Tax Incentive Program offers
seven types of tax incentives to qualified production companies. Ariz. Dep't of Commerce, Motion Picture
Production Tax Incentives Program Summary (Oct. 19, 2006), http://www.azcommerce.com/doclib/finance/
mopic%20program%20summary.pdf. The three major incentives are a transaction privilege tax exemption on
machinery, printing, leases or rentals of lodging, catered food and drink, and construction contracts; a use tax
exemption on machinery, equipment, and other tangible personal property; and income tax credits. Id. Utah provides
a Motion Picture Incentive Fund, which is a post-performance rebate returning fifteen percent for every dollar spent
in the state. Utah Film Comm'n, Motion Picture Incentive Fund, http://film.utah.gov/incentives/mpif.htm (last
visited Oct. 21, 2007). The state also grants production companies a sales tax exemption on machinery and
equipment. Utah Film Comm'n, Sales and Use Tax Exemption, http://film.utah.gov/incentives/sute.htm (last visited
Oct. 21, 2007). Additionally, Utah's transient room tax rebate exempts persons occupying a public accommodation
for thirty consecutive days or more from sales and use taxes on their accommodation charges. Utah Film Comm'n,
Transient Room Tax Rebate, http://film.utah.gov/incentives/trt.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2007). Colorado and Texas
offer the most limited incentive packages in the region. The Colorado legislature passed the state's first-ever film
incentive in 2006. Colo. Film, Colorado Film Incentives, http://www.coloradofilm.org/locationcoloradofilmincentives.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2007). The Colorado Film Incentive Program rebates ten percent of the
below-the-line cost of projects produced and filmed in Colorado when the production company spends seventy-five
percent of its below-the-line budget in Colorado and hires seventy-five percent of its crew locally. Id. "Below-theline" refers to production costs for the technical crew (including production managers, script supervisors, make-up
artists, and editors); studio rental; the art department; sets; location fees; housing and transportation; insurance; and
taxes. DEsI K. BOGNAR, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF BROADCASTING AND FILM 27 (2d ed. 2000). In Texas,

filmmakers are fully exempt from state and local sales taxes on most items and services bought and rented for
production. Tex. Film Comm'n, Financial Incentives in Texas, http://www.governor.state.tx.us/divisions/filml
incentives (last visited Oct. 21, 2007). The state's six percent occupancy tax on hotel rooms occupied for more than
thirty consecutive days can also be waived. Id.Additionally, filmmakers may benefit from a fuel tax refund for fuel
used off-road in generators or boats. Id. Beginning September 1, 2007, Texas will also offer a grant equal to five
percent of in-state spending (6.25 percent for certain underused areas). Tex. Film Comm'n, Production Grants,
http://www.governor.state.tx.us/divisions/film/incentives/grants.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2007). Interestingly,
despite its limited incentive offerings before the grant program was implemented, Texas was number ten on
P3/Production Update magazine's list of the top ten places to shoot in the United States. Jason Deparis, Top 10
Places to Shoot in the U.S., P3/PRODUCTION UPDATE, July 2006, at 19, 19-20. Texas received this rank due to the
strength of its crew base and infrastructure. Id.
62. See CEIDR REPORT, supra note 3, at 6-7 (listing increases in various types of productions).
63. Id. at 4-5.
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television in the United States grew twenty-four percent between 2000 and 2005,
while Canadian filming of scripted television fell twenty-three percent.' In fact, the
number of scripted productions filmed in the United States, but outside of
California, grew fifty-four percent.65 This trend may be especially helpful to smaller
production centers, which are typically involved with lower-budget productions
such as television projects.'
On a national level, the American Jobs Creation Act of 200467 is the "closest
thing to a federal tax rebate as possible. ''68 The Jobs Creation Act was designed to
curb runaway production.6 9 It applies Internal Revenue Code provisions "to film and
television productions in addition to any state incentive plan."7 ° Internal Revenue
Code (I.R.C.) section 181 allows any taxpayer investing in a qualifying film project
to receive one hundred percent of the loss in the year or years the money is spent.7 1
The limit is up to $15 million per film and $15 million per television episode up to
forty-four episodes.72 The incentive, unless extended, expires on December 31,
2008. 7 3 I.R.C. section 199 applies to film, music, video, and all other manufacturing
companies that receive income from the sale of their products. 74 It allows a threepercent tax deduction until 2007, a six-percent deduction from 2007 to 2010, and
a nine-percent deduction from 2010 on.75
P3/ProductionUpdate magazine suggests that the days when "runaway" referred
to foreign countries snagging domestic business are over: "With the new wave of
tax incentives spreading across this nation, this is no longer the case. The United
States and its territories have now become Hollywood's 'backlot."' 7 6 The next
section will explore how New Mexico became Hollywood's backlot and
demonstrate how New Mexico's production incentives are not only helping to stem

64. Id. at 6. The CEIDRReport suggests that "[a] variety of factors, led by the soaring value of the Canadian
dollar, have given Canada a runaway film production problem of its own." Id. at 35. "With foreign film production
down almost 40 percent from the peak years of 1999 and 2000, the debate in Canada has become how to compete
with lower-cost areas like Eastern Europe or American states.. .that have recently introduced attractive filmmaking
subsidies." Id.
65. id. at 6.
66. Smaller production centers are those other than Los Angeles and New York City. See MONITOR REPORT,
supra note 1,at 15.
67. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
68. Colo. Film, supra note 61.
69. Id. The Jobs Creation Act seems to have accomplished its objective of discouraging runaway production.
The CEIDR Report notes that the relative share of television shows (including made-for-television movies, miniseries, and broadcast and cable television shows) produced in the United States versus Canada increased following
the passage of the Jobs Creation Act. CEIDR REPORT, supra note 3, at 6-7. The report also states that the Jobs
Creation Act provides considerable benefit to producers of made-for-television movies and mini-series. Id. at 6.
70. Colo. Film, supra note 61. The incentives are for all taxpayers, whether individuals or corporations. Id.
71. I.R.C. § 181(a) (2007); Colo. Film, supranote 61.
72. I.R.C. § 181(a)(2)(A); Colo.Film, supranote 61.
73. I.R.C. § 181(f); Colo. Film, supra note 61.
74. I.R.C. § 199(a)-(d) (2007); Colo.Film, supra note 61.
75. I.R.C. § 199(a)(1)-2); Colo. Film, supra note 61.
76. Deparis, supranote 61, at 19. Deparis' article lists the following states as the top ten places to shoot in
the U.S. due to factors such as financial incentives, cost of living, and revenue generated from the film and
television industry: (1) Louisiana, (2) New Mexico, (3) Florida, (4) New York, (5) Hawaii, (6) North Carolina, (7)
Georgia, (8) Virginia, (9) Utah, and (10) Texas. Id. at 19-34. A "backlot" or "lot" refers to a large land area where
exterior sets are constructed on a studio complex. BOGNAR, supra note 61, at 24, 147.
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the national tide of economic runaway production, but are also stimulating economic
growth within the state.
III. THE NEW MEXICO FILM INCENTIVE PROGRAM
While an increasing number of states are offering tax credits and incentives to
lure Hollywood dollars, New Mexico is actually investing in film and has
established a $276 million fund for that purpose.77 New Mexico's Film Incentive
Program was recognized by the 2005 Center for Entertainment Industry Data and
Research production report as one of the most generous and "enormously
successful" in the country.78
The New Mexico legislature created the Severance Tax Permanent Fund (STPF)
in 1973 as an endowment fund to receive severance taxes on natural resources
extracted from state lands. 7 9 These funds have historically been used to retire debt
from bond issues that have funded capital projects.8 0 The STPF is heavily reliant on
positive investment returns for growth, as up to ninety-five percent of New
Mexico's severance taxes have been available for debt service since 2003.81 The
New Mexico State Investment Council (SIC) is charged with managing and growing
New Mexico's permanent fund through professional investment in industries such
as film and real estate. 2 Filmmaking has generated over $725 million in new
revenue for state and local economies, 3 and the fund has been called "[t]he force
behind New Mexico's film boom." "4
The New Mexico Constitution mandates a balanced budget.8 5 This mandate
facilitated legislation such as the Severance Tax Bonding Act (Act), which regulates
the investment in films to be produced in New Mexico.8 6 The Act is consistent with
the mandate because it provides a vehicle for the state to make profits rather than

77. CEIDR REPORT, supra note 3, at 65; Patrick Goldstein, The Big Picture:Another SuitorforFilmmakers,
L.A. TtMES, Sept. 30, 2003, at El; N.M. STATE INV. CouNCIL, supra note 4, at 1.
78. CEIDR REPORT, supra note 3, at 65-66.
79. N.M. State nv. Council, Severance Tax Permanent Fund, http://www.sic.state.nm.us/severance.htm (last
visited Oct. 21, 2007). Article VUI, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution states:
There shall be deposited in a permanent trust fund known as the "severance tax permanent fund"
that part of state revenue derived from excise taxes that have been or shall be designated
severance taxes imposed upon the severance of natural resources within this state, in excess of
that amount that has been or shall be reserved by statute for the payment of principal and interest
on outstanding bonds to which severance tax revenue has been or shall be pledged. Money in
the severance tax permanent fund shall be invested as provided by law. Distributions from the
fund shall be appropriated by the legislature as other general operating revenue is appropriated
for the benefit of the people of the state.
N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 10(A).
80. N.M. State Inv. Council, supra note 79.
81. Id.
82. N.M. State Iv.Council, Mission, http://www.sic.state.nm.us/mission.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
83. "3:10 to Yuma" Remake Being Shot in N.M., ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 21, 2006, at El.
84. Simon Romero, Coming Soon to a Screen Near You: New Mexico, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 26, 2004, at C6.
85. See Article IX, section 8 of the New Mexico Constitution, which restricts state indebtedness:
No debt shall be so created if the total indebtedness of the state, exclusive of the debts of the
territory, and the several counties thereof, assumed by the state, would thereby be made to
exceed one percent of the assessed valuation of all the property subject to taxation in the state
as shown by the preceding general assessment.
N.M. CONST. art. IX, § 8.
86. Severance Tax Bonding Act, NMSA 1978, § 7-27-5.26 (2007).
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borrow money. Under the Act, up to $15 million may be invested in any one New
Mexico film project, provided the total investment is no more than six percent of the
market value of the STPF.87 Additionally, the State Investment Officer and the SIC
are to invest only in projects that (1) are filmed wholly or substantially in New
Mexico, (2) possess a distribution contract with a reputable distribution company,
(3) employ a majority of New Mexicans on their production crews, (4) have posted
a completion bond, and (5) have obtained a full guarantee of repayment of the
invested amount in favor of the STPF.88
Although this legislation is relatively recent, the film industry is no stranger to
New Mexico. Approximately 482 movies and television shows have been filmed in
the state since 1898,89 when Edison Manufacturing Co. first shot Indian Day
School.9° Even more films were produced in New Mexico throughout the early
twentieth century. 9' The Motion Picture Industry Promotion Commission was
established in 1970.92 The Commission changed its name to the New Mexico Film
Office (NMFO) in the 1990s. 93 Its current mission is to support the motion picture
industry in the state and promote tourism by showcasing New Mexico's natural
assets through the medium of film.94 The NMFO introduced its Film Incentive
Program in 2002. 9' The program was so successful that, in just two years, the state
went from hosting zero to twenty-five projects.96
New Mexico's financial structure and regulations such as the Severance Tax
Bonding Act have expanded the authority and influence of the New Mexico Film
Office, while other western states like California and Colorado are downsizing their

87. Id. § 7-27-5.26(A).
88. Id. Requirements (1) and (3) raise Dormant Commerce Clause and Privileges and Immunities Clause
concerns, respectively. See infra Part IV.
89. See N.M. Film Office, New Mexico Filmography, http://nmfilm.com/filming/filmography/ (last visited
Oct. 21, 2007).
90. EconomicDevelopment andNew Mexico Tourism, QUIPU (N.M. State Records Center& Archives, Santa
Fe, N.M.), July 2004, at 2, available at http://www.nmcpr.state.nm.us/pubs/quipulquipu-julyO4.htm; INDIAN DAY
SCHOOL (Edison Mfg. Co. 1898).
91. A sampling of these films from different decades includes The Man from the West (Lubin Mfg. Co.
1914); Redskin (Paramount Pictures 1929); Billy the Kid (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1930); and The Grapes of Wrath
(Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. 1940). Other well-known films shot in whole or in part in New Mexico in more
recent decades are Salt of the Earth(Indep. Prod. Co. 1954); Oklahoma! (Magna Corp. 1955); Journey to the Center
of the Earth (Twentieth Century-Fox 1959); Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid (Twentieth Century-Fox 1969);
Easy Rider (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1969); Jonathan Livingston Seagull (JLS Partnership 1973); Convoy (EMI
Films 1978); Superman: The Movie (Alexander Salkind 1978); The Muppet Movie (Henson Assocs. 1979); Twins
(Universal Pictures 1988); Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade (Lucasfilm Ltd. 1989); City Slickers (Castle Rock
Entm't 1991); Natural Born Killers (Alcor Films 1994); Wyatt Earp (Warner Bros. Pictures 1994); Clockers (40
Acres & A Mule Filmworks 1995); Mad Love (Touchstone Pictures 1995); Fools Rush In (Columbia Pictures Corp.
1996); Independence Day (Twentieth Century Fox 1996); Lolita (Guild 1997); Armageddon (Touchstone Pictures
1998); Wild Wild West (Peters Entm't 1999); All the Pretty Horses (Columbia Pictures Corp. 2000); The Tao of
Steve (Good Machine 2000); Traffic (Bedford Falls Prods. 2000); 21 Grams (This Is That Prods. 2003); Brokeback
Mountain (Alberta Film Entm't 2005); The Longest Yard (Paramount Pictures 2005); North Country(Warner Bros.
Pictures 2005); Beerfest (Adobe Pictures 2006); and Wild Hogs (Touchstone Pictures 2007). N.M. Film Office,
supra note 89.
92. Economic Development and New Mexico Tourism, supra note 90, at 2.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Borys Kit, New Mexico Bolstering Incentivesfor Film Biz, HOLLYWOOD REP., Mar. 2, 2005, at 16.
96. CEIDR REPORT, supranote 3, at 65.
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film commissions due to budgetary concerns.97 A leading entertainment industry
journal related that "New Mexico has led the way in film tax legislation, becoming
a model for others to follow as well as a leader in fighting runaway production to
Canada."98 Governor Bill Richardson explained the state's bold efforts to support
the film industry: "'Our main objective is to become a supportive satellite of
Hollywood....We don't want to be greedy with this, but for a state with low per
capita income, it's a way for us to attract a clean, environmentally friendly industry
that leaves a positive impact."' 99
The NMFO seems to be accomplishing Richardson's objective, billing itself as
' °
"a film office willing to jump through rings of fire. '""
It does so through three
major initiatives: the 25% Film Production Tax Rebate,'°' the Film Investment Loan
Program," and Nontaxable Transaction Certificates."13 Each initiative has its own
eligibility criteria and is designed to meet different production needs.
The 25% Film Production Tax Rebate grants a twenty-five percent refund on all
direct production expenditures subject to taxation by the state of New Mexico. 0°45
This refund covers the full amount of the expenditure, not just the tax portion.
Feature films, television projects, national and regional commercials, documentaries,
video games, or post-production may qualify for the rebate if they meet certain
requirements. °6 For example, the NMFO forbids scripts from being obscene in
97. Romero, supranote 84, at C6.
98. Kit, supra note 95, at 16. New Mexico's incentives have not gone unnoticed by film office administrators
in other states. The director of the Mississippi Film Office, Ward Emling, acknowledged New Mexico as one of
three states offering incentives that make it less costly to film there than in Mississippi. Nell Luter Floyd, State
Hopes to Regain Share of Filmmakers, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Jan. 11, 2007, at 1C. Emling stated,
"'New Mexico has an appealing program because it deals with work-force training, which is a component of our
overall program."' Id. at 5C. The New Mexico Film Office "offers a 50% reimbursement of wages for on-the-job
training of New Mexico residents in advanced below-the-line crew positions" through the Film Crew Advancement
Program. N.M. FiLM OFFICE, NEW MExico's FILM INCENTIVES 28 (2007), available at New Mexico State
Investment Council, New Mexico's Film Incentives, http://www.sic.state.nm.us/PDF%20files/NEWMEXICO_
FILMINCENTIVESSept2007.pdf [hereinafter N.M. INCENTIVES]. Enrollment in this program requires a
production company to submit registration and application forms. Id.
99. Romero, supra note 84, at C6. The NMFO has established a green filmmaking initiative, which is a
voluntary program to encourage "environmentally sensitive film [and] television production." N.M. Film Office,
Green Filmmaking, http://www.nmfilm.com/filming/green-filming/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2007). The initiative is
built around three principles: educating and encouraging productions to use environmentally sensitive materials and
techniques; using green materials and techniques where necessary; and providing the resources for productions to
go green. See id.
100. N.M. INCENTIVES, supra note 98, at 1.
101. Id. at 2.
102. Id. at9.
103. Id. at 29.
104. Id. at 2.
105. Id. For instance, if the cost of an item including tax is one hundred dollars, the rebate will be twenty-five
dollars. Id. This offering is both comprehensive and unique, as none of New Mexico's neighboring states offer such
a generous rebate. See supra note 61. Utah offers a similar rebate, but it covers only fifteen percent of the
expenditure. Id.
106. N.M. INCENTIVES, supra note 98, at 2. Requirements for the twenty-five percent rebate include:
" Script cannot be obscene in nature.
* Film shall contain an acknowledgement that the production was filmed in the state of New
Mexico.
" Production shall agree to pay all obligations the film production company has incurred in
New Mexico.
" Production shall agree to publish... notice.. .of the need to file creditor claims against the film
production company by a specified date ....
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nature,107 requires productions to acknowledge that they were shot in New Mexico,
requires payment of all obligations incurred while in-state, and requires parties to
enter into a contract binding them to the terms of the rebate program. ' 08 Types of
expenditures covered by the rebate include wages and salaries for New Mexico
residents (including talent, management, and labor), set construction, lighting,
operations, wardrobe costs, facility and equipment rental, food and lodging, leasing
of vehicles, and insurance and travel if purchased through a New Mexico-based
agency." Productions wishing to take advantage of the twenty-five percent rebate
must file budget, payroll, crew, and shooting location information with the
NMFO." 0
The Film Investment Loan Program offers interest-free loans for up to fifteen
million dollars per qualifying film or television project."' While the fifteen million
can represent the total budget, the production must have a budget of at least two
million dollars." 12 Scripts must be submitted to the NMFO for pre-approval, and may
not include excessive or gratuitous violence, sexual content, hard language, drug

" Production shall agree that outstanding obligations are not waived should a creditor fail to
file by the specified date.
" Production shall agree to delay filing of a claim for the Production Tax Rebate until the New
Mexico Film Office delivers written notification to the Taxation and Revenue Department
that the film production company has fulfilled all requirements for the credit.
" Production shall agree to enter into a contract with the New Mexico Film Office... accepting
the terms of the above.
Id.
107. The First Amendment prohibits Congress from abridging the freedom of speech: "Congress shall make
no law.. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. This prohibition is applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the Supreme Court considered the
validity of a state statute prohibiting the distribution of obscene matter. Although Justice Burger noted that "no
majority of the Court has at any given time been able to agree on a standard to determine what constitutes obscene,
pomographic material subject to regulation under the States' police power," id. at 22, he made it clear that "obscene
material is unprotected by the First Amendment." Id. at 23. While the Court recognized that "[s]tate statutes
designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited," id. at 23-24, it articulated the following test for
obscenity:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
id. at 24 (citations omitted). The Court limited its holding on the permissible scope of state regulation of obscenity
to works depicting or describing sexual conduct. Id. Thus, the NMFO's anti-obscenity requirement may not be
immune from constitutional challenge if "obscenity" is defined not just in terms of sexual conduct, but vulgarity
or violence. Drawing the line between obscenity and artistic expression may be difficult.
108. N.M. INCENTIVES, supra note 98, at 2.

109. Id. at 3. "Talent" refers to actors or performers. BOGNAR, supra note 61, at 248.
110. N.M. INCENTIVES, supra note 98, at 5-8.
111. Id. at 9.
112. Id. N.M. INCENTIVES does not specify whether a film with a budget totaling a certain amount under the
$15 million limit may ultimately receive more than the amount originally budgeted through the Film Investment
Loan Program. See id.

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 37

abuse, or culturally-sensitive material." 3 In addition, the film or show needs to be
"wholly or substantially shot in New Mexico," meaning that at least eighty-five
11 4
percent of principal and second unit photography must be completed in-state.
Finally, the production is obligated to furnish a guarantor for the principal amount
of the loan and a distribution contract from a reputable distributor and to allocate
sixty percent of below-the-line payroll and body count to New Mexico residents." 5
Two public hearings are required before funds are disbursed, the first before the
Private Equity Investment Advisory
Committee (PEIAC) and the second before the
6
State Investment Council."1

Nontaxable Transaction Certificates (NTTCs) waive gross receipts tax (sales tax)
at the point-of-sale.' Nontaxable Transaction Certificates work like grocery store
coupons and are primarily used by producers of local, regional, and national
advertisements.' '1 When producers present an NTTC at the point-of-sale, no sales
tax is charged." 9 Direct production costs qualify for NTTCs, 2 ° but the certificates

113. Id. at 10. In Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), the Supreme Court distinguished the advocacy
of violence from actual violence. In this case, petitioner, a Ku Klux Klan leader, was convicted under Ohio's
Criminal Syndicalism statute when he invited local newsmen to film a Klan rally. Id. at 444-45. The rally involved
speeches, a cross burning, and hooded figures brandishing firearms. Id. at 445. The Supreme Court overturned
petitioner's conviction because the statute was overbroad, falling to distinguish advocacy from incitement to
imminent lawless action. Id. at 448-49. This case stands for the principle that
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
Id. at 447. Thus, unless a film or project "preparfes] a group for violent action and steel[s] it to such action," id. at
448, it is constitutionally protected speech. Therefore, New Mexico's exclusion of excessively violent projects may,
depending on the circumstances, impermissibly intrude upon First Amendment freedoms by "sweep[ing] within
its condemnation speech which our Constitution has immunized from governmental control." See id.
114. N.M. INCENTIVES, supra note 98, at 9. If a production company only makes the eighty-five percent
requirement for principal shooting days, the NMFO will allow second unit photography to take place out-of-state,
but the production company must then allocate sixty percent of second unit payroll to New Mexico residents. Id.
The shooting requirement implicates Dormant Commerce Clause concerns. See infra Part V.A. Principal
photography refers to the phase of film production during which the movie is actually shot. Principal Photography,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principalphotography (last visited Oct. 25, 2007). Second unit footage typically
includes minor shots like those to establish mood or scenery, which are filmed away from the actual set. See
BOGNAR, supra note 61, at 221.
115. N.M. INCENTIVES, supranote 98, at 9. The allocation requirement implicates Privileges and Immunities
Clause concerns. See infra Part IV.C.
116. N.M. INCENTIVES, supranote 98, at 15. The Private Equity Investment Advisory Committee is composed
of State Investment Officer (SIO) Gary Bland and four members appointed by the Governor. N.M. State Inv.
Council, Private Equity Investment Advisory Committee, http://www.sic.state.nm.us/peiac.htm (last visited Oct.
21, 2007). All appointees have extensive financial and investment experience and serve the state in a fiduciary
capacity. Id. The SIO may invest in private equity funds upon the approval of PEIAC and SIC. N.M. State Inv.
Council, Private Equity Investment Program, http://www.sic.state.nm.us/private-equity.htm (last visited Oct. 21,
2007). The primary responsibility of SIC is to administer and manage New Mexico's three permanent trust
funds:
the Severance Tax Permanent Fund, the Land Grant Permanent Fund, and the Tobacco Settlement Permanent Fund.
N.M. State Inv. Council, Investing in New Mexico's Children, http:lwww.sic.state.nm.us/ (last visited Oct. 21,
2007). The SIO and PEIAC consider investments in private equity funds that enhance the economic development
objectives of the state, provided these investments offer safety and a rate of return comparable to other currently
available private equity investments. N.M. State Inv. Council, supra.
117. N.M. INCENTIVES, supra note 98, at 29.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. Direct production costs include payments to talent, management, and labor; editing expenses;
construction, wardrobe, and lighting costs; and facility and equipment rental. Id.
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may not be used in conjunction with the 25% Film Production Tax Rebate.' 2' A
registration
and application process is required before a production can receive the
122
NTTCs.

The three initiatives described above are the backbone of "one of the nation's
most aggressive film incentive programs."' 23 New Mexico's economically targeted
program is one of "bold outreach,"'' 24 intended by the legislature to encourage the
development of a film production industry within the state. 125 As of July 31, 2007,
New Mexico's Film Investment Program had $166,635,189 in outstanding loans and
loans in closing, with a remaining capacity of $110,208,237.26 These figures
together represent six percent of the market value of the Severance Tax Permanent
Fund (STPF). 127 As noted above, up to fifteen million dollars may be invested in any
one New Mexico film project under the Severance Tax Bonding Act, provided
that
28
no one film receives more than six percent of the STPF's market value.1
Recent productions that have used New Mexico's incentives include WildfireThe Series-Season 4; Bordertown, starring Jennifer Lopez; and Employee of the
Month, starring Jessica Simpson. 29 Wildfire received a $15 million loan, spent $15
million in New Mexico, and hired 184 New Mexican crew members. 30 Bordertown
received a $15 million loan, spent $18,203,431 in New Mexico, and hired 137 New
Mexican crew members. 13 1 Employee of the Month received a $13,002,694 loan,
132
spent $8,132,265 in New Mexico, and hired 237 New Mexican crew members.
Recently released productions filmed in New Mexico using state tax incentives
include Kid Nation, Transformers,In the Valley of Elah, and 3:10 to Yuma. 33 The

121. Id.
122. Id. The application process involves filing a Film Production Company Registration form, an Application
for Business Tax Identification Number, and an Application for Nontaxable Transaction Certificates with the New
Mexico Film Office. Id. The New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department will then send the production
company a business identification number and sixteen N'lTCs. Id.
123. Romero, supra note 84, at C6.
124. Goldstein, supra note 77, at El.
125. See N.M. STATE INV. COUNCIL, FILM INVESTMENT PROGRAM LOAN POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 1-2
(2007), http://www.sic.state.nm.us/PDF%20files/Film Investment_LoanPolicy_andProcedures.pdf.
126. N.M. STATE INV. COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 1.
127. See id. The total capacity of the Film Investment Loan Program, $276,843,426, represents six percent
of the market value of the Severance Tax Permanent Fund. Id.
128. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
129. Wildfire-The Series-Season 4 (ABC Family/Lionsgate Television 2007); BORDERTOWN (Mobius
Entm't Ltd. 2006); EMPLOYEE OF THE MONTH (Lionsgate 2006). Bordertown has yet to be released in the United
States. Internet Movie Database, Release Dates for BORDERTOWN, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0445935/releaseinfo
(last visited Oct. 21, 2007). Employee of the Month was released on October 6, 2006 and grossed $28,444,855 in
the domestic box office. Box Office Mojo, Employee of the Month, http://www.boxofficemojo.coml
movies/?id=employeeofthemonth.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
130. N.M. STATE INV. COUNCIL, FILM INVESTMENT PROGRAM ECONOMIC IMPACT AS OFJULY 31,2007 (2007),
http://www.sic.state.nm.us/PDF%20files/NMFilmInvestmentProgram_7.31.07_Final.pdf.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Kid Nation (Tom Forman Productions 2007); TRANSFORMERS (DreamWorks SKG 2007); IN THE
VALLEY OF ELAH (Warner Independent Pictures 2007); 3:10 TO YUMA (Lionsgate Films 2007). N.M. Film Office,
New Mexico Filmography, supra note 89. Kid Nation was shot near Santa Fe and premiered on CBS on September
26, 2007. Polly Summar, New Law Keeps Entertainment Industry from Working N.M. Kids Too Hard,
ALBUQUERQUEJ., July 18,2007, availableat http://www.abqjournal.com/santafe/579117northnews07-18-07.htm.
Kid Nation has recently sparked controversy in New Mexico for the treatment of children on set. Id. The premise
of the show is forty kids building a new world out of a nineteenth-century ghost town without adults or modem
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New Mexico Film Incentive Program has generated more than $725 million in
activity for the state since Governor Richardson took office in 2003.134
New Mexico's Film Incentive Program is a positive example of how a state can
fight against runaway production, stimulate economic growth, and create jobs on a
local level.1 35 However, constitutional challenges to state tax incentives that have
arisen in other industries are potential nails in the coffin for the program.' 36 The next
section examines the legality of offering tax incentives for economic development
and the implications for New Mexico's fledgling film industry.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NEW MEXICO
FILM INCENTIVE PROGRAM
New Mexico's model works because when locally produced shows and movies
make money, the state is a profit participant. 3' 7 Even if the state does not make much
of a profit, however, it still wins through significant job creation and in-state
spending. 38 The fact that the state has "a big rooting interest in [a project's]
success" demonstrates New Mexico's film-friendliness, which serves to "smooth[]
over the bureaucratic hurdles that often beset filmmakers in less welcoming
environs."'' 39 Producer Todd Hallowell stated, "'if other states start emulating what
New Mexico is doing, it could be another nail in the coffin for keeping filmmaking
in Los Angeles. '"" 40

conveniences. Id. New Mexico passed new legislation specifying rules for the treatment of minors working on
television, film, and theatrical productions after receiving word that children on the show "'were working 24 hours
in some cases"' and were not provided set teachers. Id. The legislation can be found at Act of April 2, 2007, ch. 257
(S.B. No. 175), 2007 N.M. Laws (revising child labor provisions to include the film industry).
134. "3:10 to Yuma " Remake Being Shot in N.M., supranote 83, at El.
135. See supra Part 11.
136. See infra Part IV.A, C.
137. See Goldstein, supra note 77, at El.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. Id. Hallowell was Line Producer on The Missing, which was filmed in New Mexico in the spring of
2003. Id. Pacifica Ventures has sought to support filmmaking in New Mexico by founding Albuquerque Studios,
a production facility slated for phase-one completion in early 2007. Bashirah Muttalib, New Mexico Heating Up,
VARIETY, Sept. 17, 2006, availableat http://www.variety.com/articleNR1117950275.html. The studios will consist
of a $74 million, twenty-eight acre complex in the Mesa Del Sol area, five minutes south of the Albuquerque
International Sunport. Id. The complex will feature eight soundstages; retail, office, backlot, mill storage and
construction space; post-production suites; and production support services. Id. Hal Katersky, Chairman and Chief
Financial Officer of Pacifica Ventures, believes that New Mexico's city and state government, in addition to its
unique incentives, allowed the project to remain viable. Id. Nick Smerigan, Vice-President of Albuquerque Studios,
confirmed that "'[e]very conceivable production that could be done on a soundstage in L.A. could be done here."'
Id. On November 15, 2007, the Sandoval County Commission approved a zoning change that will allow iTraditions!
Marketplace off the Budhagers exit on Interstate 25 north of Albuquerque to transform itself from retail space to
a new film studio, New Mexico Film Studios. Susan Stiger, Studio in the Works for State, ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov.
16, 2007, availableat http://www.abqjoumal.com/news/state/262317nm 1-16-07.htm. Los Angele-based Creative
Capital Group is arranging the financing for the project. Id. The studios will feature four soundstages and
groundbreaking is slated for January 1, 2008. Id. Production may begin as early as May 1, 2008. Id. In the initial
stages, the studios expect to create hundreds of new jobs, ranging from lower-wage jobs in food preparation and
security to higher-paying positions in high-tech production. Id. A few industry terms used in the articles mentioned
above are worth defining here. A "soundstage" is an "acoustically and climatically-controlled studio or building
where sound recording and sound filming" take place. BOGNAR, supra note 61, at 234. "Post-production" is work
or activity following the filming process, such as picture and sound editing, music, special effects, printing, and
other arrangements used to complete the program or film. Id. at 191-92.
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While the success of the New Mexico Film Incentive Program is laudable,
lawmakers and program administrators must be aware that the Dormant Commerce
and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the federal constitution could limit the
program's parameters and serve as a check on its future expansion. While
entertainment-related tax incentives have yet to be challenged in any federal or state
court, other industries that provide tax incentives for economic development have
been attacked on these grounds.' 41 Generally, these incentives raise constitutional
concerns because they place discriminatory burdens on commerce with sister states
and subject non-residents of a state to disparate treatment when compared with state
residents.'42
The Commerce Clause and the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause
feature a unique interplay. They have a "mutually reinforcing relationship" that
stems from their shared history. 41 3 Both clauses originate in the Fourth Article of the
Articles of Confederation and express similar visions of federalism.'" The
Commerce Clause restricts a State's ability to favor its own citizens in the utilization
of natural resources found within its borders but destined for interstate commerce.145
The Privileges and Immunities Clause bars discrimination against citizens of other
states when there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere
fact that they are citizens of other states. 46 Together, the Clauses limit the extent to
which a state can justify economic discrimination in favor of residents on the basis
of its purported ownership of certain resources. 47 Both Clauses could potentially
place constitutional limitations on New Mexico's Film Incentive Program.

141. Entertainment incentives may not have been challenged yet due to the widespread use of arbitration to
resolve disputes within the industry. Other industries whose tax incentives have been attacked include the energy,
alcohol, manufacturing, finance, and agricultural industries. See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269 (1988) (energy); Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (alcohol); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984) (manufacturing); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977)
(finance); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (agriculture).
142. See, e.g., Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. 318; Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
143. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531-32 (1978).
144. Id. at 532. The Fourth Article of the Articles of Confederation provided:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the
different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, vagabonds and
fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens
in the several states; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from
any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the
same duties, impositions, and restrictions, as the inhabitants thereof respectively; provided, that
such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property, imported into any
State, to any other State of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also, that no imposition,
duties, or restriction, shall be laid by any State on the property of the United States, or either of
them.
Id. at 533 n.16 (quoting 9 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 908-09 (Library of Congress ed. 1907)
(1777)).
145. Id. at 533.
146. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 396.
147. See Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 533.
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A. Dormant Commerce Clause Limitations to the New Mexico Film Incentive
Program
State tax incentives to stimulate industrial development have long been a feature
of American political and economic life. 148 These incentives, whether in the form of
credits, subsidies, or abatements, typically fall within the "universe of state action"
regulated by the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 49 The affirmative
commerce power, articulated in Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution,
grants Congress the authority "[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."' 50 In the landmark case of
Gibbons v. Ogden,'5 ' Justice Marshall defined commerce as "every species of
commercial intercourse.. .which concerns more States than one."' 2 By this
definition, Congress has the power to regulate commercial activity only when it
reaches more than one state.
The Commerce Clause serves as both a source of federal power and a limit on
state power. 53 Congress may regulate any local or interstate activity that, alone or
in combination, has a substantial economic effect upon interstate commerce. 154 Even
in the absence of federal legislation, states are prohibited from discriminating
against interstate commerce by the negative or dormant implications of the
Commerce Clause. 155 The Dormant Commerce Clause framework allows state
governments to regulate local aspects of interstate commerce, provided the
regulation is not unduly burdensome and does not discriminate against out-of-state
competition to benefit local economic interests.'56 In other words, the burden on
interstate commerce must not outweigh the promotion of legitimate local benefits.'57
State tax incentives, regardless of their form, typically possess two features that
render them suspect under the doctrine barring discrimination against interstate
commerce. 58 First, these incentives single out activities occurring within the taxing
state for favorable treatment."' Second,
states use their "coercive machinery"' 6 to
' 6'
"bite.'
their
give the tax incentives
The challenge here is almost paradoxical-to distinguish constitutionally benign
incentives designed to attract business from unconstitutionally discriminatory ones

148. Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development
Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789, 790 (1996).
149. Id. at 793-94.
150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
151. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
152. Id. at 193-94.
153. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrTIONAL LAW 281 (5th ed. 1995).
154. See id. at 288-89.
155. Philip M. Tatarowicz & Rebecca F. Mims-Velarde,An AnalyticalApproachto State Tax Discrimination
Under the Commerce Clause, 39 VAND. L. REV. 879, 882 (1986).
156. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 153, at 288-89.
157. See id.
158. Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 148, at 793.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 794.
161. Id. at 806. This has often resulted in taxpayers paying higher taxes unless they engaged in in-state sales.
See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988) (ethanol sales); Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias,
468 U.S. 263 (1984) (alcohol sales); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (securities
sales).
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intended to do the same thing. 62 This inquiry reflects the "palpable tension" found
within the Supreme Court's decisions concerning state tax schemes over the past
three decades.1 63 While the Court has allowed states to structure their tax systems to
promote the growth and development of intrastate commerce and industry,' 6 it has
also invalidated1 65state tax incentives adopted to stimulate local business and promote
local products.

The five cases discussed below each involve a state's attempt to encourage
economic activity within its borders.' 66 In each case, the Supreme Court struck down
the initiatives "with rhetoric so sweeping as to cast a constitutional cloud over all
state tax incentives."'' 67 Examining the rationale used to condemn these tax
incentives provides insight into potential Commerce
Clause limitations that could
168
threaten the New Mexico Film Incentive Program.
1. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.: Evenhanded Statutes with Incidental Effects on
Commerce Are Upheld
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 69 articulates the modern test used to decide when a
state regulation that affords local industry economic advantages at the expense of

162. Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 148, at 791.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 336.
165. See, e.g., Bacchus Imps., Ltd., 468 U.S. at 273.
166. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (packaging requirement); Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S.
318 (transaction tax); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984) (DISC tax); Bacchus Imps., Ltd., 486
U.S. 263 (liquor excise tax); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988) (ethanol tax).
167. Hellerstein & Coenen, supranote 148, at 794.
168. DaimlerChryslerCorp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006), decided in May 2006, is the Supreme Court's
latest word on the constitutionality of state tax incentives. Although the case involved a Dormant Commerce Clause
challenge to state tax incentives, it was not decided on the merits and thus will not be included in the discussion of
constitutional limitations to New Mexico's Film Incentive Program. In this case, the city of Toledo contracted with
DaimlerChrysler to expand its Jeep assembly plant in exchange for a property tax waiver. Id. at 1859.
DaimlerChrysler also received a credit against the state franchise tax when it purchased and installed new
manufacturing machinery and equipment, which was a state benefit given for new investment. Id. Plaintiffs, who
were city and state taxpayers, sued, alleging that the tax breaks DaimlerChrysler received violated the Commerce
Clause and increased their state and local tax burdens. Id. Defendant DaimlerChrysler removed the action to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. Id. at 1860. The District Court denied plaintiffs' motion to remand
the matter to state court and on the merits found that the tax benefits did not violate the Commerce Clause. Id. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed that the state franchise tax credit violated the Commerce Clause,
but found that the municipal property tax exemption did not. Id. Defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari to review the Sixth Circuit's invalidation of the franchise tax credit, and plaintiffs sought review of the
Sixth Circuit's upholding of the property tax exemption. Id. The taxpayers asserted that they were injured by
DaimlerChrysler's tax breaks because the tax breaks diminished funds available to the city and state, thus imposing
a "'disproportionate burden"' on taxpayers. Id. at 1859. They claimed they had standing to challenge the franchise
tax credit by virtue of their status as Ohio taxpayers. Id. at 1860, 1862. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
the taxpayers lacked standing under Article III of the Constitution to challenge state tax or spending decisions
simply because of their status as taxpayers. Id. at 1864. The taxpayers' claims that DaimlerChrysler's tax credit
depleted the Ohio treasury and imposed disproportionate burdens on them were no different from similar claims
previously rejected under Article mII
as insufficient to establish standing. Id. at 1863. Here, plaintiffs could not
demonstrate that they sustained a direct injury, only that they "suffer[ed] in some indefinite way in common with
people generally." Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)). Therefore, the case was not
decided on the merits because the taxpayers were unable to challenge Ohio's spending decisions simply by virtue
of their status as taxpayers. Id. at 1864.
169. 397 U.S. 137.
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the national market should be upheld. 7 ° At issue here was the Arizona Fruit and
Vegetable Standardization Act (Arizona Act). 7 ' The Arizona Act required all
cantaloupes grown in Arizona and offered for sale to be packed in approved closed
containers."' Appellant Pike, the official charged with enforcing the Arizona Act,
issued an order prohibiting appellee, a commercial farm company, from transporting
uncrated cantaloupes from its ranch in Arizona to a nearby California packing
facility.'73 Appellee brought an action in federal court to enjoin the order as
unconstitutional."7 The three-judge tribunal granted a permanent injunction on the
ground that the order appellant issued was an unlawful burden upon interstate
commerce. 767 On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
judgment.
The Supreme Court held that the Arizona Act unconstitutionally burdened
interstate commerce because its practical effect would have compelled the farm
company to build packing facilities in Arizona at an approximate cost of
$200,000.177 The Court articulated the following test for determining the validity of
state statutes that affect interstate commerce:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then
the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and
on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities. Occasionally the Court has candidly undertaken a balancing approach
in resolving these issues, but more frequently it has spoken in terms of "direct"
and "indirect" effects and burdens.'
The state of Arizona stipulated that the primary purpose of the Arizona Act was to
promote and preserve the reputation of state growers by prohibiting deceptive
packaging. 79 While the Court acknowledged that this was a legitimate state interest,
it could not constitutionally justify the requirement that the
appellee "build and
' 80
operate an unneeded $200,000 packing plant in the State.'
The Court stressed that it views state statutes that require business operations to
be performed in the home state when they could be performed more efficiently
elsewhere with particular suspicion.18 ' Even where a state is pursuing a clearly
legitimate local interest, the Court declared this particular burden on commerce to
170.
171.
172.
173.
in Parker,
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 153, at 308-09.
Pike, 397 U.S. at 138.
Id.
Id. The packing facility was located in Blythe, California, thirty-one miles away from appellee's ranch
Arizona. Id. at 139.
Id. at 138.
Id.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
Id. at 143.
Id. at 145.
Id.
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be virtually per se illegal. 182 Because the Arizona statute in question imposed a
"straightjacket" on the farm company with respect to allocation of its interstate
resources and because the state offered no compelling interest for the packing
requirement,183 the Court held that the Arizona Act violated the Commerce
Clause. 184

2. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission: Discriminatory Taxation
of Out-of-State Products and Business Operations Prohibited in Competition for
Commerce
At issue in Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission1 85 was the
constitutionality of an amendment to New York's longstanding tax on securities
transactions.18 6 Since 1905, New York imposed a transfer tax on securities
transactions if part of the transaction occurred within the state. 187 Concerned about
the competitive disadvantage to New York trading, 188 the state legislature amended
the transfer tax statute in 1968 so that transactions involving out-of-state sales were
taxed more heavily than most transactions involving in-state sales. 89
' Appellants, six
regional stock exchanges, filed an action in state court against the State Tax
Commission."9 They alleged that the 1968 amendment unconstitutionally
discriminated against interstate commerce by imposing a greater tax burden on the
out-of-state sale of securities than on in-state transactions of the same magnitude.' 9
The Supreme Court held that New York's amendment discriminated against
interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. 192 The amendment was
unconstitutional because it extended a financial advantage to sales on the New York
exchanges at the expense of the regional exchanges. 93 It "foreclose[d] tax-neutral
decisions" and discriminatorily burdened sister states' commerce because sellers
could substantially reduce their tax liability by selling in-state. 94 An individual
faced with the choice of an in-state or out-of-state purchase would be hard-pressed
to make that choice without regard to the tax consequences. 9' By imposing a greater
tax liability on out-of-state sales than on in-state sales, the New York transfer tax
fell short96 of the "substantially evenhanded treatment" required by the Commerce
Clause. 1

182. Id. For more on local interests burdening commerce being declared per se illegal, see, for example,
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (commercial shrimping); Johnson v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 16 (1928) (oyster
harvesting); and Foster-FountainPacking Co., 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (shrimping).
183. The Court noted that the state's interest here, enhancing the reputation of its growers, was "certainly less
substantial than a State's interest in securing employment for its people." Pike, 397 U.S. at 146.
184. Id.

185. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
186. Id. at319.
187.

Id.

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 323.
Id. at319.
Id. at319-20.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 331.
Id.
Id. at 332.
Id.
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In reaching its decision, the Court articulated a fundamental principle of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence dispositive in the case: "No State, consistent with
the Commerce Clause, may 'impose a tax which discriminates against interstate
commerce.. .by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business. " 97 This
prohibition against discriminatory treatment of interstate commerce flowed from the
basic purpose of the Commerce Clause-to create an area of free trade among the
states. 198
The majority explained that despite the Court's decision, states are not precluded
from structuring their tax systems to encourage the development of industry, nor are
they prohibited from competing with other states for a share of interstate
commerce.'99 However, in the process of competition, no state may discriminatorily

tax products manufactured or business operations performed in another state.2°
3. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully: 20' Tax Schemes Foreclosing TaxNeutral Decisions Offend the Commerce Clause
New York was back at the Court six years later in a challenge surrounding a
congressional act that provided U.S. firms with tax incentives to increase their
exports through the creation of specially recognized Domestic International Sales
Corporations (DISCs).2 2 A corporation was recognized as a DISC if substantially
all its assets and gross receipts were export-related.2 3 DISC legislation concerned
New York,2° which stood to lose millions of dollars if no provisions were made to
tax DISCs, even if taxation might discourage their formation. 25 The State addressed
its concern by granting a DISC tax credit when exports shipped from a taxpayer's
regular place of business within New York. 2°6 Appellant Westinghouse was a
Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of electrical parts and
appliances.2 7 Westinghouse Electrical Export Corporation, one of its subsidiaries,
20 8
was a Delaware corporation that qualified as a federally tax-exempt DISC.

At the Supreme Court, Westinghouse argued that requiring it to compute its
franchise tax liability on a consolidated basis with Westinghouse Export and
limiting the tax benefit of the DISC export credit to gross receipts shipped from New
York violated the Commerce Clause. 209 The Court held that New York's actions
allowing corporations a tax credit on the accumulated income of their subsidiary
DISCs discriminated against export shipping from other states and violated the

197. Id. at 329 (quoting Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959)).

198. id.
199. Id. at 336-37.
200. Id. at 337.
201. 466 U.S. 388 (1984).

202. Id. at 390.
203. Id. at 390-91. Gross receipts are "[t]he total amount of money or other consideration received by a
business taxpayer for goods sold or services performed in a year, before deductions." BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY

564 (8th ed. 2004).
204. Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 392-93.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 393.
207. Id. at 394.
208. Id.

209. Id. at 395-96.
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Commerce Clause.2 1° The DISC credit was awarded in a discriminatory fashion, as
it was based on the percentage of a DISC's shipping conducted from within the state
of New York.2 I'
The Court revisited Boston Stock Exchange, reiterating that a state may not
impose a tax that discriminates against interstate commerce by providing a direct
commercial advantage to local business.2 12 Here, it was not the provision of the tax
credit that offended the Commerce Clause, but that New York impermissibly tied
the percentage of business conducted in-state to the credit in its competition for
business with other states.213 The Court articulated the principle that regardless of
"[w]hether [a] discriminatory tax diverts new business into the state or merely
prevents current business from being diverted elsewhere, it is still a discriminatory
tax that 'forecloses tax-neutral decisions.' 21 4 In Westinghouse, New York's tax
credit was struck down because it created an advantage for in-state companies by
placing a discriminatory burden on commerce to its sister states. 215
4. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias: Facially Discriminatory Statutes Favoring
Local Business Are Unconstitutional
The Supreme Court considered a constitutional challenge to the Hawaii liquor tax
in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias.2 16 The tax, a twenty-percent excise tax imposed on
wholesale liquor sales, was enacted to defray the costs of police and governmental
services arising from liquor consumption. 21 7 The Hawaii state legislature exempted
okolehao and pineapple wine from the tax to encourage the development of the
Hawaiian liquor industry.2 18
Appellant Bacchus Imports, a liquor wholesaler, disputed the tax on Commerce
Clause grounds.219 It paid the tax under protest and commenced an action in the Tax
Appeal Court for a refund. 220 The Tax Appeal Court rejected Bacchus's
constitutional claim. 22 1 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed the
decision of the Tax Appeal Court.2 2 2 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.223
Again relying on Boston Stock Exchange, the Court held that the Hawaii liquor
tax exemption for okolehao and pineapple wine violated the Commerce Clause
because it had the purpose and effect of discriminating against interstate commerce

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 407.
Id. at401.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 406 (quoting Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977)).
Id.
468 U.S. 263 (1984).
Id. at 265. An excise tax is a "tax imposed on the manufacture, sale, or use of goods..., or on an

occupation or activity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (8th ed. 2004).

218. Bacchus, 486 U.S. at 265. Okolehao is a brandy distilled from the tiplant, an indigenous Hawaiian shrub.
Id.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 266.
Id.
Id. at 267.
Id.
Id. at 277.
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in favor of local products.224 The Court found that the tax exemption was facially
discriminatory.225 It bestowed a commercial advantage on local products, fostering
the local liquor industry by encouraging increased consumption of its products.226
Appellee, Director of Taxation of Hawaii, argued that the small volume of sales of
exempted liquor did not constitute a competitive threat to other non-exempted
liquors. 227 However, the Court declared that it was unnecessary to determine "'how
228
unequal [a] Tax is before concluding that it unconstitutionally discriminates.'
The legislation at issue in Bacchus was tantamount to economic protectionism,
whereby Hawaii unconstitutionally promoted domestic commerce by burdening
other states' industry and business in an unequal and oppressive manner. 229 Because
the Commerce Clause furthers federal interests through the prevention of economic
Balkanization, it was irrelevant that the state legislature did not intend to
discriminate by enacting the tax exemption. 2" Therefore, the determination of
constitutionality does not depend on whether one focuses on the benefited or
burdened party 23 but on the rule that states may not favor local businesses over outof-state businesses in their tax transactions.232
5. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach: Discriminatory Statutes May Be
Upheld If They Advance a Legitimate Local Purpose
At issue in New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach233 was an Ohio tax credit
awarded for each gallon of ethanol sold by fuel dealers. 234 The Ohio credit was
originally available without regard to the source of the ethanol, but a 1984 statutory
amendment denied the credit to ethanol coming from a state that did not grant a tax
credit to Ohio ethanol.235 If a state granted a smaller tax advantage than Ohio's, Ohio
granted only an equivalent credit to ethanol from that state.236
Appellant New Energy Company was an Indiana limited partnership that
manufactured ethanol in Indiana for sale in several states, including Ohio.237 By
reason of Ohio's reciprocity provision, the ethanol New Energy sold in Ohio became
ineligible for the Ohio tax credit. 23 8 New Energy sought declaratory and injunctive

224. Id. at 272-73.
225. Id. at 268.
226. Id. at 269.
227. Id. at 268-69.
228. Id. at 269 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 760 (1981)).
229. Id. at 272.
230. Id. at 273.
231. Id.
232. Id at 272.
233. 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
234. Id. at 271. The interest in ethanol emerged in reaction to the oil embargos of the 1970s, and the product
was first federally subsidized in 1978. Id. Many states in grain-producing areas of the country enacted their own
ethanol subsidies shortly thereafter. Id. at 272. Ohio was one such state and initiated its first ethanol subsidy in 198 1.
Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 273.
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relief. The Ohio Supreme Court found that the amendment was not protectionist or
unnecessarily burdensome.239
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed this judgment, holding that the health and
commerce justifications presented for the statute did not validate the "plain
discrimination" against products manufactured out-of-state. 24 0 The Court held that
the Ohio provision explicitly deprived certain products of generally available
beneficial tax treatment because they were made in other states, thus facially
violating the cardinal Commerce Clause requirement of nondiscrimination. 241' The
Court explained that the Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits economic
protectionism in the form of "regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state
economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors. 24 2 Statutes that
discriminate against interstate commerce are routinely struck down unless "the
discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic
protectionism."243
In New Energy, the Court held that the state of Ohio could not use the threat of
economic isolation as a weapon to force sister state Indiana to enter into a desirable
reciprocity agreement. 2" The threat used to procure Indiana's acceptance was taxing
a product made by its manufacturers at a higher rate than the same product made by
Ohio manufacturers without justification.245 The effect of refusal was that "the outof-state product [was] placed at a substantial commercial disadvantage through
discriminatory tax treatment.",2' The Ohio provision imposed an economic
disadvantage on out-of-state sellers, and the promise to remove that disadvantage
if reciprocity was accepted could not justify the disparity of treatment. 247
The Supreme Court invalidated the Ohio ethanol subsidy because it constituted
discriminatory taxation against an out-of-state manufacturer rather than direct
subsidization of domestic industry, which does not regularly run afoul of the
Commerce Clause.248 This case left open the possibility that a state may validly
enact a statute that "discriminates against interstate commerce by showing that it
advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives. 249
B. Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis of the New Mexico Film Incentive
Program
To reiterate, New Mexico's Severance Tax Bonding Act (Act) regulates the
investment in films to be produced in the state.250 Under the Act, up to $15 million

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id.
Id. at 280.
id. at 274.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 274.
See id. (quoting Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 379 (1976)).
Id. at 276.
Id. at 275.
Id.
Id. at 278.
Id.
Severance Tax Bonding Act, NMSA 1978, § 7-27-5.26 (2007).
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may be invested in any one New Mexico film project, provided it is no more than
six percent of the market value of the Severance Tax Permanent Fund (STPF).25'
The State Investment Officer and the State Investment Council are to invest only in
projects that (1) are filmed wholly or substantially in New Mexico, (2) possess a
distribution contract with a reputable distribution company, (3) employ a majority
of New Mexicans on their production crews, (4) have posted a completion bond, and
(5) have obtained a full guarantee of repayment of the invested amount in favor of
the STPF.252
Requirement one implicates the Dormant Commerce Clause, as filmmakers who
take advantage of New Mexico's Film Investment Loan Program must complete at
least eighty-five percent of principal and second unit photography within the state.253
As previously discussed, the Dormant Commerce Clause allows state governments
to regulate local aspects of interstate commerce as long as the regulation does not
discriminate against out-of-state competition for the benefit of local economic
interests.254 While there is evidence that the New Mexico Severance Tax Bonding
Act and the New Mexico Film Incentive Program violate the Dormant Commerce
Clause's cardinal nondiscrimination requirement, an equally valid claim can be
made that they are constitutional.
In Pike v. Bruce Church,Inc., the Supreme Court described a balancing test used
to determine when a statute burdening interstate commerce may be upheld. 255 The
Pike test only applies to a statute that even-handedly regulates to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest whose effects on interstate commerce are
incidental. 256 However, this test cannot apply to the Act because the Act is not an
even-handed regulation.
The statute in Pike was even-handed because it imposed the uniform requirement
that all cantaloupes grown in Arizona and offered for sale be packed in closed
containers. 257 But the Severance Tax Bonding Act states that film investments must
be wholly or substantially shot in New Mexico,5 8 therefore applying to recipients
of the Film Investment Loan Program. 9 In contrast, neither the 25% Film
Production Tax Rebate nor the Nontaxable Transaction Certificates require that
eighty-five percent of principal and second unit photography occur in New

251. Id. § 7-27-5.26(A)-(B).
252. Id. § 7-27-5.26(C)(1)-(5).
253. N.M. INCENTIvEs, supra note 98, at 9.
254. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 153, at 288-89.
255. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The Pike majority stated, "Occasionally the Court
has candidly undertaken a balancing approach in resolving these issues, but more frequently it has spoken in terms
of 'direct' and 'indirect' effects and burdens." Id. at 142 (citations omitted). However, Nowak & Rotunda cite Pike
as an example of the viability of Justice Stone's original balancing doctrine as applied to outgoing commerce.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 153, at 304. They comment that the Court "usually looks at what is really
happening economically, and then applies Stone's balancing test. Each case turns on a weighing of all the relevant
circumstances rather than the application of mechanical tests...." Id. Justice Stone wrote the majority opinion for
several Supreme Court cases involving the Dormant Commerce Clause during the first half of the twentieth century.
See id. at 301.
256. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
257. Id. at 142-43.
258. Severance Tax Bonding Act, NMSA 1978, § 7-27-5.26(C)(1) (2007).
259. N.M. INCENTIvEs, supra note 98, at 9.
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Mexico. 26 Thus, because users of those incentives do not fall within the purview of

the Severance Tax Bonding Act, it cannot be said to regulate even-handedly.
Therefore, the Pike test is inapposite, and an alternative framework must be used.
The eighty-five percent quota that the New Mexico Film Incentive Program
imposes and the Severance Tax Bonding Act validates is constitutionally flawed for
two reasons. First, the Act is facially discriminatory. It precludes investment in film
projects not wholly or substantially shot within the state of New Mexico. This
parallels the liquor tax exemption in Bacchus and the ethanol subsidy in New
Energy, which were facially discriminatory because they bestowed an outright
commercial advantage on locally-produced products.26' In New Energy, the majority
asserted that the standards to justify facial discrimination are262high and that facial
discrimination at minimum "'invokes the strictest scrutiny."'
A facially discriminatory statute seems to invite a charge of economic
protectionism, where states enact regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state
economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors. 263 The Severance Tax
Bonding Act is designed to provide New Mexico with financial benefits in the form
of positive investment retums 264 and social benefits in the form of a vibrant film
industry. 265 Out-of-state competitors may be burdened by the requirement that
eighty-five percent of principal and second unit photography must be completed in
New Mexico, thus limiting their ability to serve as filming locations.
The second reason why the Severance Tax Bonding Act is constitutionally flawed
is because it ties a percentage of business conducted in the state to the receipt of an
interest-free loan. Similarly, in Westinghouse, DISC credits were awarded based on
the percentage of DISC shipping conducted from New York.2" The Court found that
it was not the provision of the credit that violated the Commerce Clause, "but the
fact that it [was] allowed on an impermissible basis, i.e. the percentage of a specific
segment of the corporation's business that [was] conducted in New York. '267 Here,
New Mexico is awarding significant incentives to productions that are filmed in the
state in whole or in substantial part.26' Like the DISC credits in Westinghouse, this
functions to divert new business into the state and prevent current business from
being diverted elsewhere. 269 For example, New Mexico's Film Incentive Program
has generated $725 million in business 270 and hosted ninety-four projects since its

260. Id. at 2, 27.
261. Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 268 (1984); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 274 (1988).

262. New Energy, 486 U.S. at 279 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979)).
263. See, e.g., New Energy, 486 U.S. at 273; Bacchus Imps., 468 U.S. at 272.
264. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
266. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 401 (1984).
267. Id. at 407.
268. The Film Investment Loan Program is a significant incentive because it offers an interest-free loan of
up to $15 million for projects meeting the eligibility criteria, including the requirement that the film be wholly or
substantially shot in New Mexico. Additionally, the $15 million can represent one hundred percent of the production
budget. N.M. INCENTIVES, supra note 98, at 9.
269. Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 406.
270. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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27 2
inception in 2002.27' The Program has received national recognition for its success
and is fighting runaway production to Canada by encouraging projects to shoot in
the United States.273
These factors indicate that New Mexico's Film Incentive Program has
discriminatory effects on commerce to its sister states. The Westinghouse Court
stated that regardless of "[w]hether [a] discriminatory tax diverts new business into
[a] State or merely prevents current business from being diverted elsewhere, it is still
a discriminatory tax that 'forecloses tax-neutral decisions.' 274 While
2 7 a tax incentive
and not an actual tax is at issue here, this distinction is irrelevant. 1
Case law leaves open the possibility that a statute discriminating against interstate
commerce may be upheld if a state can show that it advances a legitimate local
purpose that cannot be served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.276
Because the Supreme Court jurisprudence is very strict and tends to disfavor tax
incentives, 277 this may be a way that New Mexico can justify its film incentive
program. If the program ever comes under fire, New Mexico can argue that the
incentive advances the legitimate local purposes of establishing a new industry and
creating jobs in a state with a low per-capita income.278 While incentives are not the
only tool to attract the film industry to a particular place, they are a very effective
one.279 Also, a state-based incentive program is inherently discriminatory because
it favors activity within the granting state. Therefore, arguably, such discriminatory
means are the only means by which an incentive program can be fostered. Thus,
New Mexico can take the position that these means are legitimate because they are
the only ones available.
While New Mexico's tax incentives may appear to be unconstitutionally
burdensome, the state can defend the Film Incentive Program by characterizing it
as a permissible competitive measure designed to spark industrial growth. Boston
Stock Exchange made it clear that states can encourage the growth of intrastate
commerce and industry and can compete with other states for a share of interstate
commerce 8 ° The primary purpose of the Severance Tax Bonding Act and the New
Mexico Film Incentive Program is to develop a film industry within the state. 28' And

unlike the statutes in Boston Stock Exchange,28 2 Westinghouse,283 and New

271. See N.M. Film Office, supra note 89.
272. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
274. Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 406 (quoting Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 331
(1977)).
275. Although imposing a tax is an affirmative, punitive act and an incentive is not punitive, the effect of
disallowing an incentive may be the same as charging a tax. In Westinghouse, the Court observed, "Nor is it relevant
that New York discriminates against business carried on outside the State by disallowing a tax credit rather than
by imposing a higher tax. The discriminatory economic effect of these two measures would be identical." Id. at 404.
276. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
277. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 98-99, 134-138 and accompanying text.
279. See supra Parts & HlI.
280. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 336-37 (1977).
281. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
282. 429 U.S. 318.
283. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
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Energy,284 where out-of-state services or products were taxed, the Act is not meant
to be punitive to out-of-state productions. The Act does not impose outright taxes
on producers whose projects fall short of the eighty-five percent filming quota, but
simply denies them participation in the Film Investment Loan Program, which is but
one incentive provided by the Act. Also, the existence of the program does not
automatically divert business from elsewhere. A registration, application, and
approval process is involved before funds are disbursed,285 implying that not every
project interested in a film investment loan will receive one.
New Mexico's Film Incentive Program is best viewed as a competitive way to
spark economic development, rather than a protectionist attempt to shelter an instate business. The Program does not seem to impose an unacceptable burden at the
expense of other states, considering that each of New Mexico's neighbors also offer
film incentives. a86 In fact, two of these states, Utah and Texas, were ranked among
the top ten places to shoot in the country for their film-friendliness. 28 7 The New
Mexico program does not "'foreclose[] tax-neutral decisions"' like the statute in
Westinghouse288 because producers can choose whether to transport their projects
Film incentives are but one
to New Mexico regardless of the tax consequences.
2 89
factor in selecting a filming location for a project.
New Mexico's Severance Tax Bonding Act and Film Incentive Program walk a
fine line between constitutionality and violating the Dormant Commerce Clause.
According to case law, a statute discriminating against interstate commerce may be
upheld if a state can show that it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be
served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives. Thus, if the program and
statute ever come under fire, New Mexico should have in its arsenal convincing
arguments that show how it is competitively encouraging interstate commerce rather
than discriminatorily burdening it.
C. Privilegesand Immunities Clause Limitations to the New Mexico Film
Incentive Program
Two Constitutional clauses preclude the government from denying selected
privileges to United States citizens.2 90 The Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or
Immunities Clause states that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. 29' In the
Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court determined that this clause does not
protect rights associated with state citizenship; it only addresses federal rights.292
These rights include the right to petition Congress, the right to vote in federal
elections, the right to interstate travel or commerce, the right to enter federal lands,

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
(1977)).
289.
290.
291.
292.

New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
N.M. INCENTIVES, supra note 98, at 9-14.
See supranote 61.
See supranote 76.
Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 406 (quoting Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 331
See supra notes 61, 76.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 153, at 343.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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or rights while in the custody of federal officers.293 Commentators have noted that
the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause actually protects very
few rights because it "neither incorporate[s]
any of the Bill of Rights nor protect[s]
294
all rights of individual citizens.,
This Comment focuses on the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause,
which reads, "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States. 295 This provision is also referred to as
the comity clause.296 It offers a specialized type of equal protection by preventing
unreasonable legal distinctions between citizens of one state and citizens of
another. 297 Any classification burdening people who are not citizens of a particular
state must reasonably relate to legitimate state or local interests.298
The Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause applies to citizenship or
residency restrictions established by both state and local governments. 299 To
determine whether such a law is valid under the Clause, the Court uses a two-part
test. 300 First, it considers whether the benefit or activity is one of the "privileges and
immunities" covered by the clause. °1 Second, it decides whether a substantial state
interest justifies the disparate treatment of nonresidents. °2 It is important to
recognize that the Article IV Clause does not protect all benefits or activities. 30 3 It
only requires equal treatment of residents and nonresidents when those privileges
and immunities "bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity" are
involved.3 °4 Private sector employment is considered a fundamental right under
Article IV analysis because it is essential to the economic vitality of the nation.3 °5
The five cases discussed below each involve residence and delineate when and
in what manner state statutes may discriminate against nonresidents in favor of
residents. 30 6 These cases are instructive when analyzing Privileges and Immunities

293.
294.
295.
296.
clause:

Id. at 79-81.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 153, at 343.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 153, at 343. Paul v. Virginia describes the purpose of the comity

[T]o place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far
as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned. It relieves them from
the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them by
other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them; it
insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the
acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; and it secures to them in
other States the equal protection of their laws. It has been justly said that no provision in the
Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute the citizens of the United States one people as
this.
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868) (footnote omitted), overruled in part on othergrounds by United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
297. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 153, at 343.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 329.
300. Id. at 330.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978).
305. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 221-22 (1984).
306. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (commercial shrimping); McCarthy v. Phila. Civil Serv.
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Clause limitations to the state residency requirements imposed by New Mexico Film
Incentive Program.
1. Toomer v. Witsell: Discrimination Against Nonresidents Barred Without
Substantial Reasons
Toomer v. Witsell3 °7 has been called "the leading modem exposition of the
limitations the [Privileges and Immunities] Clause places on a State's power to bias
employment opportunities in favor of its own residents. 3 °8 In Toomer, a suit was
brought to enjoin as unconstitutional the enforcement of several South Carolina
statutes regarding commercial shrimping off the coast of that state.30 9
The fishery at the center of this litigation extended across state lines from North
Carolina to Florida.1 ° It was not federally regulated, but effectively partitioned at
state lines.31' Many individual commercial shrimpers, including appellants, wished
to trawl off the Carolinas in the summer, following the shrimp down the coast to
Florida.31 2 However, each state involved was concerned with channeling to its own
residents the business derived from local waters.3" 3 Official bilateral bargaining was
the only method by which states could obtain for their citizens the right to shrimp
in waters adjacent to other states.314
Although South Carolina enacted several statutes governing shrimping during
open fishing season in the three-mile maritime belt off its coast, appellants focused
their attack on a provision that required nonresidents to pay shrimp boat license fees
one hundred times greater than the fee that residents had to pay.31 5 Appellants
argued that the purpose and effect of this statute was not to conserve shrimp, but to
exclude nonresidents and create a commercial monopoly on the resource for state
residents.316
The Supreme Court held the South Carolina provision unconstitutional.3 7 The
Court explained that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was originally designed
to guarantee that a citizen of one state would enjoy the same privileges as citizens
of another state when that citizen ventures into the other state.318 One such privilege
in State B "on
guaranteed by the Clause is that citizens of State A can do business
31 9
terms of substantial equality with the citizens of that State.

Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (continuing residency); Baldwin, 436 U.S. 371 (recreational hunting); Hicklin v.
Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (flat employment preference); United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 465 U.S. 208
(municipal residency).
307. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
308. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 525.
309. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 387.
310. Id.

311. Id. at388.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 395 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 3379). Residents were required to pay twenty-five dollars to license
a shrimp boat, while nonresidents were charged $2,500. Id. at 389.
316. Id. at 395.
317. Id. at 403.
318. Id. at 395.
319. Id. at 396.
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However, the Court cautioned that the Privileges and Immunities Clause is not
absolute.32 ° It bars discrimination against citizens of other states when there is no
substantial reason for it beyond the fact that they are citizens of other states. 32' But
it does not preclude disparity of treatment when there are valid independent reasons
for the disparity. 322 The inquiry in each case involves considering (1) whether
independent reasons exist, (2) whether the degree of discrimination is closely related
to the reasons for it, and (3) states' 323
considerable leeway to "analyz[e] local evils
and... prescrib[e] appropriate cures.
The Court found that the South Carolina provision plainly discriminated against
nonresidents such that its practical effect was to exclude.324 The Court declared that
the state's argument that the statute's purpose was to conserve the state's shrimp
supply by preventing excessive trawling overlooked the purpose of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause. 325 The Clause outlaws classifications based on
noncitizenship unless noncitizens "constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which
the statute is aimed. 326
Nothing in the record indicated that nonresidents used bigger boats or different
fishing methods that justified the discrimination practiced against them.327 Thus, the
Court concluded that no reasonable relationship existed between the danger
represented by noncitizens as a class and the severe discrimination they were subject
to in the form of near-exclusion. 328 As a result, the Court struck down the South
Carolina provision under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.329
2. McCarthy v. PhiladelphiaCivil Service Commission: Bona Fide
Continuing Residency Requirements are Constitutional
McCarthy v. PhiladelphiaCivil Service Commission33° is a two-page per curiam
opinion involving a continuing Pennsylvania residency requirement. Appellant, a
sixteen-year employee of the Philadelphia Fire Department, was terminated after
moving his permanent residence from Philadelphia to New Jersey. 33' He did so in

320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.

323. Id.
324. Id. at 396-97.

325.
326.
327.
328.

Id. at 397-98.
Id.
Id. at 398-99.
Id. at 399.

329. Id. at 403.
330. 424 U.S. 645 (1976). Please note that this case implicates the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or
Immunities Clause rather than the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause. I have included it here because,
although the case involved an equal protection challenge to a municipal residency requirement, it did not settle the
Article IV issue regarding whether public employers could delineate such residency requirements. See NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 153, at 330. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465
U.S. 208, 219, discussed infra, found that private sector economic activity was protected by Article IV. The United
Building court cited McCarthy with approval, noting that there is no fundamental right to government employment
for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. United Building, 465 U.S. at 219; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supranote
153, at 330.
331. McCarthy, 424 U.S. at 645.
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contravention of a municipal regulation obligating Philadelphia city employees to
be city residents.332
Appellant challenged the constitutionality of the regulation as violative of his
federally protected right of interstate travel.333 The Supreme Court noted that in
previous cases, it held that residence ordinances similar to Philadelphia's were "not
irrational., 334 However, the Court had never specifically addressed appellant's
contention that he had a constitutional right to be employed by the city of
Philadelphia while living elsewhere. 335 The Court stated that there was no precedent
in support of such a claim and sustained the city's regulation.336
The Supreme Court differentiated between a continuing residency requirement
and a requirement of prior residency of a given duration.337 It did not question either
the validity of the condition placed upon municipal employment that a person be a
resident at the time of his application, or of "'appropriately defined and uniformly
applied bona fide residence requirements.,' 3 8 Thus, Philadelphia's regulation was
upheld as a bona fide continuing residence requirement.339
3. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of Montana: Fundamental Rights
Require Equal Treatment of Residents and Nonresidents
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of Montana340 questioned the disparate
treatment of nonresidents within the state of Montana's hunting license system. 34 '
At the time of the suit, Montana maintained a significant population of big game,
and its elk population was one of the largest in the country. 342 The Montana Supreme
Court characterized big game hunting as a sport; in fact, elk were not hunted
commercially in the state. 343 Elk management was expensive because more of the
Fish and Game Commission's personnel time was spent on elk than on any other
species of big game. 3"
Appellants, a Montana hunting guide and four nonresident big game hunters,
instituted a federal suit for declaratory and injunctive relief and for partial
reimbursement of hunting fees already paid. 345 Appellants were disturbed by the
policy that nonresidents were obligated to purchase a combination of hunting
licenses that cost seven-and-a-half times more than what state residents were

332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 646 (citing Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit,
405 U.S. 950 (1972)).
335. Id. at 646-47.
336. Id. at 647.
337. Id.
338. Id. (quoting Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255 (1974)).
339. Id.
340. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
341. Id. at 372.
342. Id. at 374.
343. Id. at 375 & n.11.
344. Id. at 376.
345. Id. at 372.
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relief, 47 and the U.S.
charged.4 The Montana District Court denied appellants all
348
court.
district
the
of
judgment
Supreme Court affirmed the
The Supreme Court quoted the district court's finding that there was no nexus
between nonresidents' right to engage in recreational hunting and fundamental
rights such as the right to vote, the right to travel, or the right to pursue a calling.349
The majority instructed that the state must treat all citizens equally regardless of
residency status only with respect to those privileges and immunities "bearing upon
the vitality of the Nation as a single entity. '350 The distinction Montana made
between residents and nonresidents in establishing access to elk hunting did not fall
within the parameters of the Privileges and Immunities Clause because equality of
access to Montana elk was not "basic to the maintenance or well-being of the
Union."35

The Court reasoned that the distinction the Montana legislature drew between
residents and nonresidents in terms of licensing fees was rationally related to the end
of preserving the elk herd, a finite resource.35 2 A statutory scheme that does not
infringe upon a fundamental interest does not need to precisely fit the legitimate.
purposes behind it; rationality is sufficient.353 The Court asserted that protection of
the wildlife in this case was peculiarly within the state of Montana's police power,
3 54
and the state had great latitude in shaping the means appropriate for its protection.
Therefore, the statute was upheld.
4. Hicklin v. Orbeck: Flat Employment Preferences are Problematic
Hicklin v. Orbeck355 dealt with an employment preference statute known as
"Alaska Hire. ' 35 6 Alaska Hire required all oil and gas leases, easements, or
agreements to contain a provision mandating the employment of qualified Alaska
residents in preference to nonresidents. 57 The Act was designed to remedy Alaska's
uniquely high unemployment rate.358 It was administered by issuing "resident cards"
to persons meeting residency requirements, who could then present the cards to
employers covered by the Act as proof of residency.359

346. Id. at 373-74. During the 1976 hunting season, a Montana resident could purchase an elk-only hunting
license for nine dollars. Id. at 373. A nonresident wishing to hunt elk, however, had to purchase a $225 combination
license that also allowed him to hunt deer, bears, birds, and fish. Id. A resident was not required to buy this
combination license, but if he did, it cost him just thirty dollars. Id. at 374. Thus, the nonresident paid seven-and-ahalf times as much as the resident. Id. If the nonresident wished to hunt only elk, he paid twenty-five times as much
as the resident. Id.
347. Id. at 373.
348. Id. at 392.
349. Id. at 378.
350. Id. at 383.
351. Id. at 388.
352. Id. at 390.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 391.
355. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
356. Id. at 520.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 526.
359. Id. at 520.
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Appellants were individuals who wished to secure jobs on the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline but could not qualify for the necessary residence cards. 360 They sued the
Alaska Department of Labor for declaratory and injunctive relief after the
commissioner of the department issued a cease-and-desist order to all unions
supplying pipeline workers. 36' The order enjoined the unions to dispatch all qualified
Alaska residents to work before any nonresidents were dispatched.362
Appellants' principal challenge to Alaska Hire was that it violated the Article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause.363 The Supreme Court determined that their
appeal to the protection of the Clause was strongly supported by prior decisions
"holding violative of the Clause state discrimination against nonresidents seeking
to ply their trade, practice their occupation, or pursue a common calling within the
State. ' 3 4
The Court relied upon Toomer v. Witsel 3 65 to analyze the constitutionality of

Alaska Hire's discrimination against nonresidents. 366 There was no showing in the
record that nonresidents were "a 'peculiar source of the evil"' the statute sought to
remedy-namely, high unemployment. 36 7 The evidence actually indicated that the
major cause of Alaska's high unemployment was not the influx of nonresidents
seeking employment, but the geographical remoteness and lack of education and
training of a substantial number of the state's jobless residents.368
Alaska Hire granted all Alaskans a flat employment preference for all jobs
covered by the Act "regardless of their employment status, education, or training. 369
It extended broadly, covering employers who had no connection to the state's oil
and gas industry, performed no work on state land, had no contractual relationship
with the state, or received no payments from the state.370 The Court saw this as
Alaska's wrongful attempt to force virtually all businesses that benefited even
remotely from the economic ripple effect of oil and gas development to bias
employment practices in favor of state residents.3 7'
The Court asserted that a state's ownership of the property with which a statute
is concerned is a factor to be considered in evaluating whether the statute's
discrimination against noncitizens violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause.372
However, Alaska's ownership of the oil and gas that was the subject matter of
Alaska Hire was deemed to be insufficient justification for the pervasive
discrimination the Act facilitated against nonresidents.373 Alaska's attempt to ease
its unemployment problem by forcing employers to discriminate against

360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

Id. at 521.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 523.
Id. at 524.
334 U.S. 385 (1948).
Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 526.
Id. (quoting Toomer, 334 U.S. at 398).
Id. at 526-27.
Id. at 527.
Id. at 530.
Id. at531.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 531.
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nonresidents could not pass constitutional muster because it was not closely
tailored
3 74
enough to aid the unemployed that Alaska Hire was intended to benefit.
Although the oil and gas upon which Alaska based its discrimination against
nonresidents was of great national importance, the breadth of the discrimination
Alaska Hire mandated went far beyond the degree of resident bias that Alaska's
ownership of the resources could justifiably support.375 Because discrimination
against nonresidents did not bear a substantial relationship to the "particular 'evil"'
they were said to represent,376 Alaska Hire failed both the Toomer test and
constitutional scrutiny.
5. United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of
Camden: The Degree of Discrimination Against a Protected Privilege Must Bear
a Close Relation to the Reasons for It
At issue in United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor & Council
of Camden377 was a Camden, New Jersey municipal ordinance that required at least
forty percent of the employees of contractors and subcontractors working on city
construction projects to be Camden residents.37 The ordinance was submitted to the
New Jersey Treasury Department and was designated a state-approved affirmativeaction construction program. 379 Appellant United Building and Construction Trades
Council, an association of labor organizations,3 0 challenged the Camden plan in
state court. 38 ' The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected appellants' attack, declining
to apply the Privileges and Immunities Clause to a municipal ordinance because it
discriminated on the basis of municipal, not state, residency. 382 The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed this decision, holding the challenged ordinance properly subject to
the strictures of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.383
The Court acknowledged that the fact that the ordinance in question was a
municipal rather than a state law did not place it outside the scope of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause for several reasons. 3' First, it was difficult to distinguish
municipal from state action in this case because the municipal ordinance would not
have gone into effect without approval by the State Treasurer.385 Second, the
constitutional challenge to Camden's resident hiring preference was a challenge to
the State Treasurer's power to adopt such a preference. 386 Finally and most
fundamentally, "a municipality is merely a political subdivision of the State from
which its authority derives. ' 387 The Court explained that while the Privileges and

374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Id. at 528.
Id. at 533-34.
Id. at 527.
465 U.S. 208 (1984).
Id. at 210.
Id. at 212.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 210.
Id.
Id.at214.
Id.
Id. at 215.
Id.
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Immunities Clause is phrased in terms of state citizenship and was designed to place
citizens of different states upon equal footing, it had never been read so literally as
to apply only to distinctions based on state citizenship.388
Next, the Court engaged in a two-step inquiry to determine whether the Camden
ordinance's discrimination against nonresidents was constitutionally suspect.3" 9 It
determined that a nonresident's interest in employment on public works contracts
in another state was analogous to the pursuit of a common calling, a "basic and
essential activity" that is "one of the most fundamental of those privileges protected
by the Clause."39° The Court reasoned that the opportunity to seek employment with
private employers such as contractors or subcontractors was "'sufficiently basic to
the livelihood of the Nation"' as to fall within the purview of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, even though the private employers here were engaged in
projects funded by a municipality.39 '
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of Montana asserted that a state's
ownership of the property with which the statute in question is concerned is a factor
to be considered in evaluating whether the statute's discrimination against
noncitizens violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause.392 The United Building
Court believed that the same analysis was appropriate in this case, where a city
attempted to bias private employment decisions in favor of its residents on publicly
funded construction projects.393
Thus, the Court found that the city of Camden's ordinance discriminated against
a protected privilege. 394 This led to the second part of the inquiry: whether the
degree of discrimination bore a close relation to the reason for it-namely, that
nonresidents constituted a peculiar source of evil at which the statute was aimed.395
While the city of Camden claimed that its ordinance was necessary to alleviate grave
economic and social ills such as unemployment and middle-class flight, the Court
required more findings of fact before it would proceed.396 As a result, it remanded
the case to the New Jersey Supreme Court to determine whether the ordinance was
an appropriate cure for Camden's problems.397 No further record exists in this case,
so it likely settled before the lower court could rule on the merits on remand.
D. Privilegesand Immunities Clause Analysis of the New Mexico Film Incentive
Program
To reiterate, New Mexico's Severance Tax Bonding Act (Act) regulates the
investment in films to be produced in the state.398 Under the Act, up to $15 million

388. Id. at215-16.
389. Id. at 218. The two-step inquiry first required the Court to decide whether the statute violated a protected
privilege under the Clause, id., then whether the degree of discrimination against nonresidents was closely tailored
to the reasons for it. Id. at 222.
390. Id. at 219.
391. Id. at 221-22 (quoting Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978)).
392. Id. at 221 (citing Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 385).

393. Id.
394. Id. at 222.

395. Id.
396. Id. at 222-23.
397. Id.
398. Severance Tax Bonding Act, NMSA 1978, § 7-27-5.26 (2007).
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may be invested in any one New Mexico film project, provided it is no more than
six percent of the market value of the Severance Tax Permanent Fund (STPF).3 99
The State Investment Officer and the State Investment Council are to invest only in
projects that (1) are filmed wholly or substantially in New Mexico, (2) possess a
distribution contract with a reputable distribution company, (3) employ a majority
of New Mexicans on their production crews, (4) have posted a completion bond, and
(5) have obtained a full guarantee of repayment of the invested amount in favor of
the STPF. 4°
Requirement three implicates the Privileges and Immunities Clause, as
filmmakers who take advantage of New Mexico's Film Investment Loan Program
must allocate at least sixty percent of below-the-line payroll and body count to New
Mexico residents.4"' As previously discussed, the Privileges and Immunities Clause
prevents unreasonable legal distinctions between citizens of one state and citizens
of another when fundamental privileges are involved.4 2
The New Mexico Severance Tax Bonding Act and the New Mexico Film
Incentive Program do not violate the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause
because they involve a protected privilege, and discrimination against nonresidents
is narrowly tailored to the reasons for it. In United Building, the Supreme Court set
forth a two-part inquiry to determine whether the Privileges and Immunities Clause
applied to a particular instance of discrimination against nonresidents. 40 3 First, the
Court must decide whether the ordinance burdens one of those privileges and
immunities protected by the Clause. 4°4 Second, it must determine whether there are
substantial reasons for the difference in treatment between residents and
nonresidents
and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to these
405
reasons.
The opportunity to pursue employment with private employers is a fundamental
right that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects.' At issue in New Mexico
is not the sport or recreation involved in Baldwin,4 7 but a legitimate, essential right.
State statutes that discriminated against nonresidents seeking to ply their trade,
practice their occupation, or pursue a common calling were struck down in
Toomer 4°8 and Hicklin40 9 because they interfered with employment rights. The
statute in Toomer made it prohibitively expensive for nonresident410 commercial
fishermen to ply their trade, to the point of near-exclusion from it. In Hicklin,

399. Id. § 7-27-5.26(A)-(B).
400. Id. § 7-27-5.26(C)(1)-(5).
401. N.M. INCENTrvEs, supra note 98, at 9.
402. See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984)
(employment); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (employment); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Mont.,
436 U.S. 371 (1978) (recreational hunting); Toomer v. Witsel, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (plying a Trade).
403. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 465 U.S. at 218-19.
404. Id. at 218.
405. Id. at 222.
406. See, e.g., id. at 221.
407. Baldwin, 436 U.S. 371.
408. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
409. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
410. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 396-97.
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Alaska Hire granted an across-the-board employment preference to state residents
that excluded more qualified nonresidents.4"'
Unlike the statutes in these cases, New Mexico's Act does not have such a broad
discriminatory effect. Out of New Mexico's three incentive packages, the Film
Investment Loan Program is the only one that requires sixty percent of below-theline payroll and body count to be allocated to New Mexico residents.4" 2 Doing so
complies with the Act's requirement that a majority of New Mexicans
be employed
13
on the production crews of projects receiving the incentive.
Feature films and television shows are the only types of projects that qualify for
the Film Investment Loan Program, leaving other genres such as documentaries,
advertisements, and video games open to quota-free nonresident employment.4 a
Also, the Act's parameters are limited to below-the-line workers. Their very name
implies their lower status on the production food chain, as above-the-line workers
are individuals with more of a creative or financial stake in a project, such as
writers, directors, talent, and producers.4 15
The Severance Tax Bonding Act's residency requirement is not unduly
burdensome because it is appropriately defined and uniformly applied. The
McCarthy Court upheld such a municipal residency requirement, which obligated
all Philadelphia city employees to live in the city. 4 16 The Act parallels the McCarthy
ordinance, as it defines the requirement that a majority of crew members be New
Mexico residents.417 This requirement uniformly applies to those who use the Film
Investment Loan Program, as they must hire a majority of New Mexicans on their
production crews, allocating sixty percent of below-the-line payroll and body count
to them.4 18 New Mexico's situation differs from McCarthy because it entails a state
regulation burdening private sector employers through a residency requirement,
rather than a municipal regulation targeting municipal employment. But because
there are valid reasons for the Act's discrimination against nonresidents, as
discussed below, it still passes constitutional muster.
Thus, the right to pursue private sector employment with production companies
that shoot their projects in New Mexico is a fundamental privilege "bearing upon
the vitality of the Nation as a single entity.' '419 The inquiry does not end there, however. The next step is to determine whether there are substantial reasons for the
difference in treatment between residents and nonresidents under the Severance Tax
Bonding Act and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to these
reasons.
The Act's discrimination against nonresidents survives Privileges and Immunities
Clause scrutiny because valid independent reasons exist for the disparity in
treatment between residents and nonresidents that are closely related to the

411. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 527.
412. N.M. INCENTIVES, supranote 98, at 9.
413. Severance Tax Bonding Act, NMSA 1978, § 7-27-5.26 (2007).
414. Id.; N.M. INCENTIVES, supranote 98, at 9.
415. See BOGNAR, supra note 61, at 1.

416.
417.
418.
419.

McCarthy v. Phila. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645, 645 (1976).
Severance Tax Bonding Act, NMSA § 7-27-5.26 (2007).
Id. § 7-27-5.26(C)(3); N.M. INCENTIVES, supra note 98, at 9.
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978).

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 37

discrimination. In Toomer, the statute had a discriminatory purpose and effect
because nonresidents were discriminated against for no substantial reason.42 ° New
Mexico, however, has substantial reasons for discriminating against nonresidents.
First, as reflected in Governor Richardson's comments, the state has a low per capita
income and is looking to attract environmentally friendly industries.42' Second, the
state wants to become a supportive satellite of Hollywood.422 Third, a crucial aspect
of the New Mexico Film Incentive Program is workforce training.423
The discrimination nonresidents face under the Severance Tax Bonding Act is
minimal. The sixty-percent quota only applies to one of the triumvirate of incentives
offered by New Mexico's Film Incentive Program, the Film Investment Loan
Program.424 It also only applies to below-the-line personnel.425 This implies that forty
percent of below-the-line crew could come from elsewhere, as well as one hundred
percent of above-the-line personnel. Practically, this makes sense because most of
the crew, including unit production managers, script supervisors, gaffers,
electricians, and make-up artists, are needed on-location.426
Additionally, New Mexico's requirement is not unique. Colorado, one of New
Mexico's bordering states, features a similar quota in its film incentive program.427
A final measure of the limited severity of the discrimination fostered by the Act is
that in its first two years of existence, the New Mexico Film Incentive Program went
from hosting zero to twenty-five projects.428 Since its inception, the program has
hosted ninety-four projects. 429 This hardly suggests that the program has a Toomerlike exclusionary effect on out-of-staters.
The Severance Tax Bonding Act is not aimed at excluding nonresidents. In fact,
out-of-state production companies constitute the vast majority of incentive
recipients. 430 This differs from the statute in Hicklin, which granted state residents
an across-the-board employment preference. 43' The New Mexico statute is more
narrowly tailored in its limitation to below-the-line workers.432 The fact that New
Mexico owns the property with which the statute is concerned is also a factor in the
analysis. 433 As in United Building, public funds are behind New Mexico's effort to
bias private employment decisions in favor of its residents.434 However, both the

420. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1948).
421. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
422. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
423. See supra note 98.
424. N.M. INCENTIVES, supra note 98, at 9.
425. Id.
426. The "unit production manager" is the individual responsible for coordinating the technical units,
budgeting, shooting schedule, and location arrangements during a television or film production. BOGNAR, supra
note 61, at 270. The "script supervisor" is the director's assistant and recordkeeper of all preparations, changes,
shots, and takes in connection with the script. Id. at 220. The "gaffer" is the chief electrician on set, who reports to
the director of photography. Id. at 106.
427. See supra note 61.
428. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
429. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
430. See supra note 91.
431. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 530 (1978).
432. N.M. INCENTIVES, supra note 98, at 9.
433. The property is the loan funds. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371 (1978);
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
434. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 221 (1984).
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statute in United Building and the New Mexico Act lack the "'ripple effect"' of the
Hicklin ordinance, where virtually all businesses that benefited in some way from
oil and gas development were forced to base their employment practices on state
residency. 435 The United Building statute only applied to employees on city public
works projects, 4 3' and the Act applies only to New Mexico residents employed as
below-the-line personnel on film or television projects using the Film Investment
Loan Program.437
New Mexico's Severance Tax Bonding Act and Film Incentive Program do not
violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause because private sector employment is
a protected privilege under the Clause, and discrimination against nonresidents is
narrowly tailored to the reasons for it. According to case law, states are empowered
to analyze local evils and prescribe cures. 43 8 Thus, the Act and program can be

considered legitimate cures for the state's lack of clean industry and low per-capita
income.
V. CONCLUSION
The plague of runaway production negatively impacts both the United States
entertainment industry and the national economy. New Mexico offers a local
solution to this national problem through the New Mexico Film Incentive Program.
The program has successfully sparked economic development in the state, which is
increasing as more productions choose New Mexico as a filming destination. While
the constitutionality of state tax incentives in other industries has come under fire
over the past three decades, entertainment-related tax incentives have yet to be
challenged in any federal or state court. However, this does not guarantee that the
New Mexico Film Incentive Program will be immune from attack in the future.
A Dormant Commerce Clause and Privileges and Immunities Clause analysis of
the program as it stands today reveals that it is arguably safe from attack. New
Mexico's Severance Tax Bonding Act and Film Incentive Program walk a fine line
between constitutionality and violating the Dormant Commerce Clause. According
to case law, a statute discriminating against interstate commerce may be upheld if
a state can show that it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be served by
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives. Thus, New Mexico's Film Incentive
Program is best viewed as a competitive way to spark economic development, rather
than a protectionist attempt to shelter in-state business.
The Severance Tax Bonding Act and Film Incentive Program do not violate the
Privileges and Immunities Clause because private sector employment is a protected
privilege under the Clause, and discrimination against nonresidents is narrowly
tailored to the reasons for it. New Mexico state officials should use the Dormant
Commerce and Privileges and Immunities Clauses as their guide should they ever
decide to change the New Mexico Film Incentive Program, always adhering to the
principle that no tax incentive may discriminate against out-of-state competition or
nonresidents in an unduly burdensome manner.
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